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FEDERALISM AND THE WILD AND SCENIC






In July 1980, then Governor Edmund Brown, Jr. nominated 4000
miles of California's North Coast rivers for inclusion in the National Wild
and Scenic River System. ' It seemed an obvious ploy: in signing separate
legislation that would complete the California Water Project by building a
long-debated canal across the Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta, 2
Governor Brown had offended the environmental community. He hoped
that his proposal for additional protection for the North Coast rivers
would placate environmentalists, while simultaneously giving the state a
broader opportunity to administer federal lands adjacent to the rivers. 3
By 1984, after expensive litigation and extensive campaigning, the
North Coast river designations have stalled and the canal has at least tem-
porarily evaporated. 4 What looked like a casebook example of federal-
state cooperation to achieve long-standing and well-defined state and na-
tional goals has turned into an unpredictable stewpot of shifting economic
interests, changing government personnel, and conflicting public poli-
cies. As the laws and regulations have evolved, so have the alliances,
their goals, and their tactics.
Governor Brown's 1980 proposal was based on an unfamiliar provision
* Associate Professor, University of California, Berkeley; B.S., 1965, Hood College; M.A.,
1969, New York University; M.A., 1974, Duke University; Ph.D., 1974, Duke University.
** Associate, Davis, Graham & Stubbs; B.A., 1974, Brown University; M.S., 1978, University
of Michigan; J.D., 1981, Stanford University.
*** Fellow, Institute for Public Representation, Georgetown University Law Center; A.B.,
1979, Harvard University; J.D., 1983, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, Berkeley.
1. The National Wild and Scenic Rivers System was created in 1968 by the Wild and Scenic
Rivers Act (WSRA), Pub. L. No. 90-542, 82 Stat. 906 (1968) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287
(1982)), to protect rivers possessing "outstandingly remarkable scenic, recreational, geologic, fish
and wildlife, historic, cultural, or other similar values." 16 U.S.C. § 1271 (1982).
2. Act of July 18, 1980, ch. 632, 1980 Cal. Stat. 1723 (codified in scattered sections of CAL.
WATER CODE (West 1982)).
3. Editorial, Save Our Wild Rivers, San Francisco Chron., Aug. 19, 1980, at 40, col. 1; U.S. to
Study Proposal on State Rivers, San Francisco Chron., July 29, 1980, at 9, col. 4.
4. The electorate rejected the canal, defeating Proposition 9 (Water Facilities Including a Periph-
eral Canal) on June 8, 1982. L.A. Times, June 10, 1982, at 16, col. 4; see infra notes 112-13.
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of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (WSRA) that allows governors to re-
quest federal protection for state-protected rivers. 5 The more usual
method for including a river in the Wild and Scenic Rivers Systems has
been by Act of Congress. 6 The less frequently used "state proposal"
method requires two basic conditions: first, the state legislature must have
previously designated the rivers as wild or scenic and, second, the Secre-
tary of the Interior must review and approve the proposed river according
to federal criteria. 7 These statutory criteria include a mandatory state
commitment, particularly significant in the North Coast rivers case, to
permanently administer proposed rivers as part of the national system. 8
The governor's request came near the close of the Carter Administration;
working in great haste and in close cooperation with the California State
Resources Agency, the Department of the Interior completed its review of
the request in January, 1981. Interior Secretary Andrus had literally but a
few hours to act on Governor Brown's request before turning his office
over to the incoming Reagan Administration. 9 The tight timing suggested
procedural irregularity and invited numerous court challenges.
A major congressional purpose behind WSRA was to control water de-
velopment.10 However, water issues only partially motivated Governor
Brown's request. A state effort to control federal land management was a
major impetus behind his rather extraordinary use of the statute."I This
was particularly true regarding the Smith River, the most pristine of the
North Coast streams and the only one running almost entirely through
national forest lands. Because the federal Act gives the state a role in
managing federally designated rivers, inclusion of the Smith River in the
system could enhance California's effort to push North Coast forest man-
agement more towards fisheries and aesthetic management and away
from timber harvest. 12 If all 3100 miles of the Smith and its tributaries
were included in the national system, huge acreages of forest land would
be affected. 13
5. 16 U.S.C. § 1273(a)(ii) (1982).
6. That method is set out in id. § 1273(a)(i). See, e.g., WSRA, Pub. L. No. 90-542, § 3. 82 Stat.
903 (1968) (codified at 16 U.S.C.); Lower Saint Croix River Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-560, § 2,
86 Stat. 1174 (1972) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1274(a)): WSRA Amendments, Pub. L. No. 93-279, §
I(a), 88 Stat. 122 (1974) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1274(a) (1982)).
7. 16U.S.C. § 1273(a)(ii)(1982).
8. Id.
9 Office of the Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Notice of Approval for Inclusion in the Na-
tional Wild and Scenic Rivers System as State Administered Components (Jan. 19, 1981) (copy on
file with the Washington Law Review).
10. Tarlock & Tippy, The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 707, 708
(1970).
II. See infra notes 187-91 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 122-23 & 187-91 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
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Secretary Andrus' cliff-hanger decision, while appearing responsive to
Governor Brown's initiative, left most of the Smith River out of the na-
tional system. As a result, Governor Brown's effort to use WSRA to in-
fluence federal land management was deflected. The implications of the
program for future state sorties into federal land management are still un-
clear, and will continue to evolve on the North Coast with implications
for similar state efforts elsewhere in the nation.
This article investigates the proposed designation of the North Coast
rivers under WSRA. It chronicles developments in the legal controversy
and relates them to the larger issues of land and water management. The
shifting legal framework and changing economic and political interests in
the North Coast controversy are particularly enlightening to students of
federalism. Lawyers are among those who may be tempted to view the
North Coast controversy in terms of federal-state conflict or intergovern-
mental cooperation run amuck, and to view the courts as an umpire in a
dispute over authority. 14
Unfortunately, such an approach would reveal very little that is useful
about what has occurred. The details of the story challenge familiar no-
tions: (1) that the federal-state conflict is the core of federalism; (2) that
cooperation between governments is preferable to confrontation; and (3)
that the role of the courts is to act (or to refrain from acting) as umpires in
the conflict.
The traditional federal-state conflict model suggests implacable,
clearly identifiable foes locked in battle over authority and control. 15 The
North Coast story is one of complex and shifting alliances that does not,
except for temporary convenience, form around identifiable-let alone
permanent-ties to a particular level of government or an institutional
configuration. Part of the state-particularly the Resources Agency and
the Governor-was initially at odds with part of the federal govern-
ment-the United States Forest Service-over priorities for North Coast
river management. There was, however, great cooperation between the
Resources Agency and other federal entities, agencies in the Department
of the Interior, in pressing for the controversial river designations. Nei-
ther the cooperation nor the conflict has been stable largely because the
players are not stable. Moreover, the Forest Service, target of the initial
action, regularly cooperates on other issues with the Resources Agency
14. For a general disussion of federalism theory, see R. LEACH. AMERICAN FEDERALISM 1-25
(1970); Fairfax, OldRecipes for New Federalism, 12 ENVTL.L. 945, 948-58 (1982); Scheiber, Fed-
eralisn and Legal Process: Historical and Contemporary Analysis of the American System, 14 LAW
& Soc'Y REv.663 (1980).
15. See D. WRIGHT. UNDERSTANDING INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS (1978); Corwin, The
Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1 (1950).
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and with many other state agencies, who frequently sue their North Coast
partners in the Department of the Interior. 16 Changing coalitions of af-
fected groups reflect the incomplete divisions between and among timber,
fisheries, mineral, water, recreation, and aesthetic interest groups and
their various state and county government allies. Evolving conditions
shift alliances and alter both the "state" and the "federal" positions.
This volatility is enhanced by the changing of administrations in both
Washington and Sacramento. The insufficiency of the traditional federal
conflict model is underscored by the tension between the designation con-
troversy, which could be forced to fit fleetingly into the format, and the
larger and more durable controversy about resource management priori-
ties which involves significantly different players, issues, and interac-
tions.
Cooperative federalism theorists will likewise find little succor in the
North Coast controversy. Cooperation in the North Coast situation is less
obviously a public virtue than standard theories of cooperative federal-
ism 1 7 would indicate, or than the elated environmental groups, thrilled by
Governor Brown's flashy proposal, might lead one to believe. 18 More-
over, the concept applies only momentarily to a small subset of the com-
plex pattern of interactions which comprise the policy field. 19
Finally, the role of the courts in this controversy is neither so pivotal
nor so profound as one might anticipate on the basis of the "court as the
umpire of federalism" concept. 20 Very few instances of litigated federal-
state conflict actually involve state and federal parties or major constitu-
tional principles. 2 1 The North Coast situation is not an exception. Al-
though it is possible that the state could become a plaintiff in a suit against
the Secretary of the Interior, they began litigation as not-wholly-comfort-
able allies defending the designations. The basic dispute was among com-
peting private groups. The litigants are a typical garden-crop of special
interests seeking to defend an advantage or prevent a barrier to their own
positions. Interestingly, it was a fragile coalition of California counties
16. See, e.g., Secretary of the Interior v. California, 104 S. Ct. 656 (1984).
17. D. ELAZAR, THE AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP. INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION IN THE NINE-
TEENTHI CENTURY (1962); M. GRODZINS. THE AMERICAN SYSTEM A NEW VIEW OF GOVERNMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES (D. Elazar ed. 1966).
18. Resource industries generally would demur, see infra Parts IV & V, and so would the U.S.
Forest Service, see infra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
20. See Wechsler. The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Compo-
sition and Selection of the National Government. in FEDERALISM MATURE AND EMERGENT (A.
McMahon ed. 1955).
21. The exceptions include California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978): Ivanhoe Irrigation
Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907): United States v.
Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
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which intitially challenged Governor Brown's proposal. 22 The legal is-
sues include a rather confusing National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA)23 compliance question, and an important but only slightly weigh-
tier statutory interpretation. Both are critical in the designation issue but
are largely unrelated to the resource management disputes that are the
heart of the conflict.
The following sections explore the complex federal-state relations sur-
rounding Governor Brown's proposal for the North Coast and Secretary
Andrus' qualified acceptance of it. The basic provisions of the federal and
state river preservation acts are set out in Parts II and III, respectively.
The discussions of the two statutes are accompanied by a brief introduc-
tion to competing governmental programs and institutions as they have
evolved at each level during the "environmental decade." These discus-
sions should underscore the ambiguity inherent in discussing "the" fed-
eral or "the" state position on any issue. The specifics of the North Coast
designation controversy-still unresolved-are explored in Parts IV and
V. These parts contrast the issues as they have been framed in the courts
with their broader policy and management implications. They emphasize
shifting coalitions of public and private interests as the core of intergo-
vernmental relations. Part IV concentrates on a general chronology of
events. Part V focuses primarily on the legal maneuvers which have fro-
zen the terms of debate artificially. Part VI concludes briefly with specu-
lation on the designation controversy and its implications for more fruitful
ways to think about federalism.
II. THE WILD AND SCENIC RIVERS ACT OF 1968 IN THE
CONTEXT OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS AFFECTING RIVER
PRESERVATION
A. The Institutional Context of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act:
Conflicting and Complementary Federal Positions on Water Policy
The WSRA was essentially a reform measure. It was specifically de-
signed to blend with not always compatible missions of established agen-
cies while remedying inadequacies in long-established state and federal
approaches to land and water management programs. As with any entrant
into a crowded policy arena,24 the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act was a
compromise, sculpted to blend new interests with old. The final wording
22. See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1976).
24. A. WILDAVSKY, SPEAKING TRUTH TO POWER: THE ART AND CRAFT OF POLICY ANALYSIS 66
(1979).
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is ambiguous at precisely the points where advocates seek clarity. As a
result, it is extremely difficult to identify "the" federal position on wild
and scenic rivers specifically, or on water more generally.
The Sagebrush Rebellion 25 has reminded us that the federal govern-
ment's role in river management evolved later than did the states' role. It
appeared at the close of the 19th century as an apparent intruder in a field
long dominated by state and private efforts; federal land and water pro-
grams grew unevenly and somewhat awkwardly over the established state
framework.26
Federal water programs in the West continue to be different from and
theoretically less comprehensive than those of the states. The federal gov-
ernment does not allocate or adjust water rights among users, nor does it
participate in the states' water allocation systems in a uniform way.
Rather, it has selectively but haphazardly superimposed its presence upon
the states, inaugurating resource management programs according to sev-
eral enumerated constitutional powers. 27 By the mid-20th century, this
incremental process of growth in federal involvement had produced di-
verse land and water management efforts spread among dozens of federal
agencies and departments. The WSRA of 1968 is one part in this complex
web of federal and state programs.
In passing a national WSRA, Congress was responding to three major
concerns. The first was the apparent inadequacy of state systems for pre-
serving and protecting rivers, especially in the West. More Western
States have historically followed the water rights doctrine of prior appro-
priation which evolved to encourage private development of water. Tradi-
tionally, water left in place was not a "beneficial use" of water and,
hence, was not protected under state law. 28 Even though several state
legislatures have moved to include instream uses within their appropria-
tion systems, 29 states still have the reputation of being poor guardians of
25. The Sagebrush Rebellion was a protest by private livestock operators and their allies in the
states against federal "intervention," particularly against involvement by the Bureau of Land Man-
agement. See S. Fairfax, Beyond the Sagebrush Rebellion: The BLM As Neighbor and Manager in
the Western States 3-7 (Mar. 1982) (paper presented at the Western Political Science Association
Meeting) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review).
26. See generally Tarlock, Recent Developments in the Recognition of Instream Uses in Western
Water Law, 1975 UTAH L. REv. 871 (1975); Comment, Minimum Streamflows-Federal Power to
Secure, 15 NAT RESOURCES J. 799 (1975).
27. These enumerated powers include the power to regulate and develop navigable waters under
the commerce clause, U.S. CONST art. I, § 8, cl. 3; the power to tax and spend for the general
welfare, id. cl. I; the authority to retain and manage lands and to reserve water for them under the
property clause, id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; and the power to enter into treaties with Indian tribes and
foreign nations, id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. U.S. CONST amend. V.
28 See Tarlock, supra note 26. at 871-75.
29. Id. at 882. E.g.. COLO REV- STAT § 37-92-102(3) (Supp. 1983); IDAHO CODE § 67-4301
(1980); MONT CODE ANN § 85-2-316 (1983), see also Andrews & Fairfax, Groundwater and Fed-
Vol. 59:417, 1984
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these uses. A major goal of WSRA was to enhance both state and federal
attention to protection of instream values. 30
Congress' second concern was to control federal water development.
Section I of the Act declares that
the established national policy of dam and other construction at appropriate
sections of the rivers of the United States needs to be complemented by a
policy that would preserve other selected rivers or sections thereof in their
free-flowing condition to protect the water quality of such rivers and to ful-
fill other vital national conservation purposes. 3
1
The federal presence in developing water, spread among numerous agen-
cies, was piecemeal and poorly integrated, yet powerful. 32 As the coun-
try's "environmental consciousness" evolved, it became highly contro-
versial. In passing WSRA, Congress sought balance in the federal
program.
A third congressional goal behind WSRA was to increase
congressional control over the federal land management agencies. 33 In
the 1960's and 1970's, "Congress took unprecedented steps in giving the
land managing agencies specific directions for managing designated areas
of the public lands" for environmental purposes. 34 The WSRA was part
of this trend toward specialized, environmentally protective legislation. It
affected the activities of the National Park Service, 35 the Bureau of the
Land Management, 36 the Fish and Wildlife Service, 37 and the United
States Forest Service. 38 Whether these agencies were preservation or
multiple-use entities made little difference; Congress intended to control
federal agency activities affecting land along designated wild and scenic
river corridors.
eralism in California's Southern San Joaquin Valley, 55 U. COLO. L. REv. n.560 and accompanying
text (1984) (in press). See generally R. DUNBAR. FORGING NEw RIGHTS IN WESTERN WATERS (1983).
30. See Tarlock & Tippy, supra note 10, at 710-11; Comment, supra note 26.
31. 16U.S.C. § 1271 (1982).
32. The major federal water construction agencies are the Army Corps of Engineers, which im-
proves rivers and harbors and builds multiple-purpose flood control projects; the Federal Power Com-
mission, an independent agency now called the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC),
which licenses private hydroelectric projects on navigable waters; and the Bureau of Reclamation of
the Department of the Interior, which builds multiple-purpose reclamation projects in the 17 western
states. The Bureau of Indian Affairs, also of the Department of Interior, finances water projects under
the federal trust responsibility to the Indians. The Department of Agriculture, through its Soil Conser-
vation Service, for many years has constructed small watershed projects throughout the United
States.
33. Tarlock & Tippy, supra note 10, at 71 I.
34. S. DANA & S. FAIRFAX. FOREST AND RANGE POLICY 224 (2d ed. 1980).
35. 16 U.S.C. § 1281(c) (1982).
36. Id. §§ 1280, 1281(c).
37. Id. § 1281(c).
38. Id. § 1281(d).
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Although WSRA was a federal effort to moderate state and federal ac-
tivities which had been focused for many decades on resource develop-
ment goals, Congress passed the Act without specifically altering the sub-
stantial existing authority to manage land and water resources. Moreover,
passage of WSRA in 1968 was but one congressional step toward altering
the government's predominantly utilitarian approach to resource manage-
ment. Federal law affecting river management and preservation continued
to expand, and implementation of WSRA has been only one strand in a
string of subsequent mandates to state as well as federal entities affecting
environmental analysis, air and water quality, and federal land-use plan-
ning.
The most important of these subsequent changes stem from the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 and the Clean Water
Act of 1977:39 regulation of "point" discharges, 40 prescription of "best
management practices" for "nonpoint" pollution sources such as timber
harvesting (section 208), 4 1 and their requirement of special "dredge and
fill permits" for the Corps of Engineers (section 404).42 The Federal Wa-
ter Pollution Control Act brought a new regulatory agency-the United
States Environmental Protection Agency-into the field, and expanded
the Corps' jurisdiction over "navigable waters" to include nearly every
surface water feature. 43 A familiar aspect of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act and most other 1970's environmental legislation is the pat-
tern of federal-state relationships mandated therein. The states were en-
couraged to define programs which would meet federally established
goals and criteria. This interaction seemed appropriate to adapting
achievement of national water quality goals to local economic and eco-
logical conditions. 44 It also occasioned vast expansion of state capabili-
ties in environmental management, and at critical junctures blurred the
distinction between state and federal actions. 45
The complex interplay of federal and state water programs has multi-
plied authorities without integrating priorities or responsibilities. The sit-
uation has been further complicated by the new multiple-use mandates
enacted by Congress for the national forests and the western public lands.
39. 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
40. Id. § 1342.
41. Id. § 1288(b).
42. Id. § 1344 (Supp. V 1981).
43. Id. 99 1341-1344:33 C.F.R. § 323.2 (1983).
44. See. e.g., CAL ST WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BD . WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD IN
1976-1977 ch. 3 (1978).
45. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS (ACIR), In Brief: STATE AND LOCAL
ROLES IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (B-6). Washington D.C., Nov.. 198 1, at 2 (citing ACIR, The Federal
Role in the Federal System (B-4) (Dec. 1980)).
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The Resources Planning Act of 1974 (RPA),46 the National Forest Man-
agement Act of 1976 (NFMA), 47 and the Federal Land Policy and Man-
agement Act of 1976 (FLPMA) 48 require the United States Forest Service
and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) to develop procedures to
integrate inventory and planning for all resources. Although the federal
land management statutes use a different format than the regulatory pro-
grams, they, too, rely significantly on federal-state interactions. Although
the language regarding federal consultation in FLPMA is more expansive
and specific than in the Forest Service statutes, 49 Congress has specifi-
cally directed that the federal agencies should manage the public re-
sources in closest possible consultation and cooperation with the states. 50
Thus, in both land and water management, state and federal programs are
deeply mixed, and it is increasingly difficult to identify national manage-
ment priorities implemented without reference to state priorities and vice
versa.
51
These same land management mandates also attempt to balance wilder-
ness preservation, wild and scenic river designation, and endangered spe-
cies protection with commodity uses through careful analysis and plan-
ning. Nevertheless, their relationship to single-purpose statutes such as
WSRA remains unclear. Although it is possible that comprehensive land-
use planning could integrate the values expressed in those statutes and
prevent further challenge based on them, the specific provisions of
WSRA are not especially helpful in defining how land management and
river preservation conflicts are to be resolved.
B. Basic Provisions of the National Wild and Scenic Rivers Act
The WSRA is a special-purpose statute designed to preserve "selected
rivers," along with their "immediate environments," that possess one or
more "outstandingly remarkable scenic, recreational, geologic, fish and
wildlife, historic, cultural, or other similar values." 52 The rivers are to be
protected for their "free-flowing" characteristics, which specifically in-
46. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1610(1982).
47. Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (codified in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
48. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (1976 & Supp.V 1981).
49. Compare id. § 1739(e) (1976) with 16 U.S.C. § 1601(c) (1982).
50. For a discussion of that directive as it applies to the Bureau of Land Management, see
Achiterman & Fairfax, The Public Participation Requirements of The Federal Land Policy and Man-
agement Act, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 501 (1979).
51. See supra note 45.
52. 16 U.S.C. § 1271 (1982).
425
Washington Law Review Vol. 59:417, 1984
clude water quality. 53 These values are imprecise, frequently sounding
more hortatory than implementable.
The Act is more concrete in defining classifications of rivers, methods
of including them in the system, and responsibilities for federal and state
agencies involved in the intricate management process. Pristine wild riv-
ers, 54 relatively undisturbed scenic rivers, 55 or developed recreational
rivers 56 may be included in the federal system. 57 Congress also estab-
lished a phased approach to river inclusion: in addition to included, fully
protected rivers, 58 it identified potential additions59 and administrative
study rivers60 in order to protect rivers under consideration. 61 Rivers may
53. Id.
54. Id. § 1273(b)(1).
55. Id. § 1273(b)(2).
56. Id. § 1273(b)(3).
57. The relationship between river classification and river management is not as clear as might be
presumed. Although it is arguable that the Act establishes management standards appropriate to the
classification in which a river is placed, such is not self-evident: rivers are classified by the adminis-
tering agency as part of its management responsibilities, not by Congress or otherwise during the
designation process. Id. § 1275. Yet, the Act states that rivers are to be managed to preserve the
values for which they are designated, thereby muddying the relationship between classification and
management. Id. § 1281.
58. Id. § 1274(a).
59. Id. § 1276(a).
60. Id. § 1276(d).
61. In most respects, rivers under consideration are treated as included rivers. Before 1976 there
was considerable confusion about whether or not "potential addition" protections applied to state
proposed rivers. In 1976, the courts ruled that the Federal Power Commission could license a hydroe-
lectric project on the New River in North Carolina which the governor and the legislature had tried to
include in the national system. North Carolina v. Federal Power Comm'n, 533 F.2d 702 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. granted, judgment vacated and remanded. 429 U.S. 891 (1976). Congress, which had been
unresponsive to New River preservation advocates before the court's decision, acted afterwards to
reverse its holding. Amendments enacted later in that year included protection for the New River in §
7(a) of WSRA, and changed the prohibition against federal water development to apply clearly to all
state-proposed rivers while the Secretary of the Interior considered their eligibility. WSRA Amend-
ments. Pub. L. No. 94-407, § 1(1), (2), 90 Stat. 1238, (1976) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1273(a)
(1982)).
The administratively selected study rivers fall into a different category than either congressionally
designated potential inclusions or state-nominated rivers. Section 5(d) of WSRA permits the Depart-
ments of Interior and Agriculture to identify and study rivers suitable for possible future inclusion in
the national system. 16 U.S.C. § 1276(d) (1982). Once a river is judged a suitable candidate by the
study agency. all federal agencies involved in "the use and development of water and related land
resources" must consider the alternative of protecting that river in their project planning process. An
initial inventory was being conducted by the Heritage Conservation and Recreation Service of the
Interior Department when that agency was abolished in 1980. PACIFIC SOUTHWEST REGION. HERITAGE
CONSERVATION & RECREATION SERV.. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR. NATIONWIDE RIVERS INVENTORY
PHASE I (1980) [hereinafter cited as PHASE 1 REPORT].
Although the U.S. Forest Service has a major stake in the results of the study, the National Park
Service is continuing the project. The 1980 Phase I report of the Department of the Interior identified
53 California rivers and streams as part of the list. See PHASE I REPORT. supra, at 16-17. However,
the list is an ever-changing one. The latest update in May 1981 added II California rivers to the list
and deleted 19, and it is difficult at any point to tell which rivers are listed and which are not. See
426
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become included in one of two ways: by congressional action, 62 or by
request from a state governor to the Secretary of the Interior. 63 The state
proposal route, which is the topic of this article, is described in section
2(a)(ii) of WSRA. 64 To qualify for federal inclusion, the river must have
been previously designated as wild or scenic by the state legislature. The
Secretary of the Interior must review the state proposal, find that the river
is eligible under the federal criteria, and approve the river. Before Gover-
nor Brown proposed the North Coast rivers, this alternative had rarely
been used. 65
PACIFIC SOLTHWEST REGION. U.S. FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP'TOF AGRICULTURE, LAND MANAGEMENT
PLANNING DIRECTION (1982).
Once a river is listed, the two departments must begin their suitability studies. Although § 5(d) of
WSRA states that the planning requirement is not triggered until a listed river is determined to be
suitable, the U.S. Forest Service takes the position that listed rivers must be protected until they are
assessed through the national forest planning process. Id. at 2-18.
This cautious approach on wild and scenic rivers has apparently been prompted by the U.S. Forest
Service's frustrating experience with wilderness study. The Forest Service, although not required to
do so by the 1964 Wilderness Act, undertook a two-phase review and evaluation of roadless areas in
national forests. The agency agreed to protect such lands until their wilderness suitability was deter-
mined. See S. DANA & S. FAIRFAX, supra note 34, at 299-302. California later sued the agency on its
decision to release certain study areas from protected status. In California v. Bergland, 483 F. Supp.
465 (E.D. Cal. 1980), California won a judgment that the Forest Service had not adequately assessed
the environmental impacts of releasing roadless study areas from protected status. Such decisions are
reflected in the agency's approach to potential wild and scenic rivers review. The 1978 amendments
to the Federal Act extended land management protections to state proposed rivers during the secreta-
rial evaluation phase. See 16 U.S.C. § 1283(a) (1982). For the rivers included in the original system,
see WSRA, Pub. L. No. 90-542, § 3, 82 Stat. 906-07 (1968) (codified at 16 U.S.C.); Lower Saint
Croix River Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-560, § 2, 86 Stat. 1174 (1972) (codified at 16 U.S.C. 1274
(a)); WSRA Amendments, Pub. L. No. 93-279, § l(a), 88 Stat. 122 (1974) (codified at 16 U.S.C.
1274(a). The potential additions were added by WSRA, Pub. L. No. 90-542, § 5, 82 Stat. 906, 910
(1968) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.). For included rivers, see Hells Canyon National Recre-
ation Area, Oreg.-Idaho Establishment Act, Pub. L. No. 94-199, § 3(a), 89 Stat. 1117 (1975);
WSRA Amendments, Pub. L. No. 94-486, §§ 101, 201, 301, 601, 90 Stat. 2327, 2327, 2329, 2330
(1976); National Parks and Recreation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-625, §§ 701-704(a), 705-708,
92 Stat. 3467, 3521-23, 3527-30 (1978); Central Idaho Wilderness Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
312, § 9(a), 94 Stat. 948, 952 (1980) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 2174 (1982)). For potential additions,
see WSRA Amendments, Pub. L. No. 93-621, § l(a),(b), 88 Stat. 2094, 2094-95 (1975); Hells
Canyon National Recreation Area, Oregon-Idaho Establishment Act, Pub. L. No. 94-199, 89 Stat.
1118 (1975); WSRA Amendments, Pub. L. No. 94-486, § 401, 90 Stat. 2327, 2330 (1976); National
Parks and Recreation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-625, §§ 721-736, § 1108, 92 Stat. 3467,
3530-32, 3547-48 (1978); National Parks and Recreation Act of 1978 Amendments Pub. L. No. 96-
199, § 102(a), 94 Stat. 67, 68 (1980) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1276 (1982)).
62. 16U.S.C. § 1273(a),(c)(1982).
63. Id. § 1273(a)(ii).
64. Id.
65. The state-nominated alternative had been used for only a few rivers: the Upper and Lower
Little Miami River in Ohio; the Little Beaver Creek in Ohio; the Lower St. Croix River in Minnesota
and Wisconsin; and the New River in North Carolina. See supra note 61. For some theories on why
the § 2(a)(ii) process is so sparingly used, see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL PROTECTION
AND PRESERVATION OF WILDAND SCENIC RIVERS IS SLOW AND COSTLY, PUB. No. CED-78-96, at 16-22
(May 22, 1978).
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The section 2(a)(ii) procedure is not well integrated with the other pro-
visions of WSRA. It is problematic because it allows states to propose
rivers flowing through federal lands. Moreover, it places primary admin-
istrative review authority in the Department of the Interior even though
the federal lands involved in the states' nominations may be national for-
ests administered in the Department of Agriculture. 66 This format invites
interest groups with conflicting goals to press for advantage in different
agencies at both levels of government. 67
The potential for such conflict is enhanced by the fact that Congress has
been very unclear regarding management criteria. The WSRA requires
the administering agency 68 to protect each included river and enhance the
66. 16U.S.C. § 1273(a)(ii) (1982).
67. Apparently Congress did not contemplate the possibility of conflict arising from aggressive
efforts to use WSRA to enhance state control over federal lands. When the issue was presented,
efforts to clarify the authority of the respective sovereigns through amending the Act were inconclu-
sive.
Originally, § 2(a)(ii) allowed a state governor to propose rivers that were "to be permanently
administered . . . by an agency or political subdivision of the State or States concerned without
expense to the United States." WSRA, Pub. L. No. 90-542, § 2, 82 Stat. 906, 906-07 (1968) (codi-
fied as amended at 16 U.S.C.). The section made no reference to any alternate administration scheme
when federal lands were involved. It thus could be interpreted to have sanctioned state-controlled
management of state-designated rivers through federal lands. However, in 1978, during an early
blush of Sagebrush-Rebellion-type state assertiveness, the governor of Oregon made the first attempt
to propose rivers in national forests. Congress quickly amended § 2(a)(ii) both to facilitate such inclu-
sions and to clarify federal-state relations concerning them. National Parks and Recreation Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-625, § 761, 92 Stat. 3467, 3533 (1978) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1273(a)
(1982)). Congress specified that:
[e]ach river designated under clause (ii) shall be administered by the State or political subdivi-
sion thereof without expense to the United States other than for administration and management
offederally owned lands. . . . Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to provide for the
transfer to. or administration by, a State or local authority of any federally owned lands which
are within the boundaries of any river included within the system under clause (ii).
Id. (emphasis added).
At the same time, it also placed a specific mandate on all federal agencies whose lands bordered on
state-proposed rivers. In a new provision, Congress required that federal agencies make formal ar-
rangements for dealing with their state counterparts in a planning process.
Section 10(e) of WSRA gives federal agencies the authority to enter into cooperative management
arrangements with the states. 16 U.S.C. § 1281(e) (1982). Section 5(c) goes somewhat further, re-
quiring state participation in federal studies if a state so requests as well as "a determination of the
degree to which the State or its political subdivisions might participate in the preservation and admin-
istration of the river should it be proposed for inclusion" in the system. Id. § 1275(a). Finally, under
§ 13(a). state jurisdiction over fish and wildlife is to remain unimpaired, except to the extent the
administering federal agency designates special "zones" and establishes regulations for them. Id. §
128 1(c).
This cooperative planning approach is not unlike FLPMA, RPA, and NFMA language on the same
subject. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text. However, the approach simply recognizes
the possibility that conflict may develop, such as that between the California Resorces Agency and
the U.S. Forest Service, it does not provide clear guidelines for resolving the conflict.
68. A river may have one administering agency, a different agency for different components, or
jointly administered segments. The agency may be federal, state, local, or an intergovernmental com-
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values which caused it to be included in the national system. 69 One might
suppose that the degree of protection afforded a river would be based on
the river's classification. However, one would be wrong: the Act specifies
protections based on river classification only with regard to mining. 70
With this one exception, classification is not clearly linked either to desig-
nation or to managment. 71
The WSRA is much clearer when it moves from land management to
agency programs affecting instream flow. This occurred partly because of
the direct impact of streamflow manipulation on the "free flowing" qual-
ities of protected streams, and partly because of the Act's specific prohi-
bitions against federal water development activities. Section 7(a) of the
Act forbids the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) from li-
censing any project "on or directly affecting" any included river.72 All
other federal agencies are forbidden from undertaking or assisting any
water resources project "that would have a direct and adverse effect on
the values for which such river was established. '73
Predictably, where the federal Act is clear, it creates equally clear po-
tential conflicts with state water law. For example, the federal Act affects
water development under state water rights systems in two ways. First, if
bination. The Act specifies that a federal agency shall be the administering agency when it dominates
a particular segment. For example, § 4(a) requires that the Department of Agriculture be identified as
the administering agency in federal studies of potential additions designated by Congress, whenever a
river flows "wholly or substantially within a national forest." 16 U.S.C. § 1275(a) (1982). Section
10(c) specifies that river segments on land administered by the National Park Service or the Fish and
Wildlife Service shall become part of the national park or national wildlife refuge systems. Id. §
1281(c).
69. 16 U.S.C. § 1281(a) (1982). The full provision reads:
Each component of the national wild and scenic rivers system shall be administered in such
manner as to protect and enhance the values which caused it to be included in said system with-
out, insofar as is consistent therewith, limiting other uses that do not substantially interfere with
public use and enjoyment of these values. In such administration primary emphasis shall be
given to protecting its esthetic, scenic, historic, archeologic, and scientific features. Manage-
ment plans for any such component may establish varying degrees of intensity for its protection
and development, based on the special attributes of the area.
Id.
70. Subject to valid existing rights, wild rivers are protected from any further mining or mineral-
leasing activity within one-quarter mile of their banks. 16 U.S.C. § 1280(a)(iii) (1982). In scenic and
recreational rivers, mining activity can proceed, but it may be regulated by the managing agency and
will result in federal title being granted only to the mineral resources and such surface resources as are
reasonably necessary for conducting mining operations. Id. § 1280(a)(i), (ii).
71. Surface coal mining cannot occur in any included rivers regardless of classification, but this
prohibition is part of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§
1201-1328 (Supp. V 1981), and not WSRA.
72. 16U.S.C. § 1278(a) (1982).
73. Id. The "adversity" requirement may not have much practical effect since any project that
benefits a river in some respects can almost always be found to conflict with other values. The possi-




a federal agency in any way assists in a state activity, the federal law will
apply. 74 Second, section 13(d) of the Act contains a standard inconclu-
sive preemption limitation: state jurisdiction over included streams is un-
impaired except to the extent it interferes with "the purposes of this chap-
ter or its administration." 75
C. Summary
WSRA does not contain particularly intricate or controversial provi-
sions; it therefore provides a clear demonstration of the futility of search-
ing for "the" federal and state positions which are central to traditional
theories of federalism. The national and congressional goal of river pres-
ervation is clear in WSRA even if management roles and criteria remain
obscure. However, it is also clear that river preservation conflicts with
other equally laudable and clearly stated congressional goals. This poten-
tial for conflict among diverse statutory definitions of congressional pur-
pose is exacerbated by the understandable tendency of agencies to exploit
the flexible language in their mandates to permit them to expand their
programs and thereby their constituencies. In so doing, it is just as under-
standable that rival federal entities seek support from like-minded state
agencies as well as among private groups. It is, indeed, difficult to con-
ceive of a policy field so unsullied by past programs, and unrelated to
similar ones, that it would not permit rival definitions of congressional
intent and, hence, multiple and conflicting definitions of the federal posi-
tion. And from the contours and setting of the California State Wild and
Scenic Rivers Act the same observation, not suprisingly, emerges.
III. THE CALIFORNIA WILD AND SCENIC RIVERS ACT OF 1972
AND THE STATE'S INTEREST IN RIVER PRESERVATION
The mere existence of the California Wild and Scenic Rivers statute76
could, and perhaps ought to, please any cooperative federalism theorist.
The federal government identified a national goal and invited responsive
action from the states. Clearly Congress anticipated subsequent enact-
ment of similar state legislation, since before a governor could nominate a
river for inclusion in the federal system, it had to be protected under state
law. 77 And with virtually no delay at all, California responded with a
nearly identical program. However, like the federal level, the state's pres-
74. Id. § 1282.
75. Id. § 1284(d).
76. Cal. WSRA of 1972, CAL. PUB. RES CODE §§ 5093.50-.69 (West Supp. 1984).
77. 16 U.S.C. § 1273(a)(ii) (1982).
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ervation programs must coexist with competing goals, interests, and
agencies; they are only one part of the state position.
A. The Institutional Context: Conflicting and Complementary State
Authorities
Like Congress, the California legislature passed its statute to balance a
water development program. North-south water transfers have been at the
heart of water planning and allocation activities in California. Northern
water was first diverted southward by the Bureau of Reclamation's Cen-
tral Valley Project. 78 That immense, multiple-unit project was originally
planned by the state, but the federal government constructed it during the
Depression and still operates it. In a 1960 referendum, California voters
authorized the State Water Project to be built and operated by the Califor-
nia Department of Water Resources. 79 This Project parallels the federal
Central Valley Project and shares some facilities with it but is basically
run independently. By the early 1970's, both the federal and state projects
were looking for new water supplies. The state facilities were only built
so as to provide about half of the water they originally contracted to de-
liver, and pressure from southern water users to complete the planned
system intensified. As the Corps of Engineers, Bureau of Reclamation,
and California Department of Water Resources all began surveying new
dam sites on the North Coast, a northern state senator successfully ma-
neuvered a California Wild and Scenic Rivers bill through the legislature.
The California statute was amended in 1982, in the heat of the North
Coast controversy. 80 The legislative action substantially altered the stakes
for several of the affected interests.
The passage of the 1972 California Wild and Scenic Rivers Act re-
sponded to interests and values regarding water management that parallel
evolving national programs discussed above. 81 California generally ad-
heres to the traditional principles of prior appropriations. Historically,
therefore, the state's water rights system has facilitated water develop-
78. Central Valley Project, CAL. WATER CODE §§ 11,100-11,925 (West 1971 &Supp. 1984).
79. California Water Resources Development Bond Act, ch. 1762, § 1, 1959 Cal. Stat. 4235
(codified at CAL. WATER CODE §§ 12,930-12,944 (West 1971 & Supp. 1984)) (adopted by vote of
the people Nov. 8, 1960).
80. Senator Peter H. Behr is generally regarded as the prime sponsor of the state act. It was
amended by Cal. WSRA Amendments, ch. 1481, 1982 Cal. Stat. 262, 262-80 (codified at CAL. PUB.
RES. CODE §§ 5093.50-.69 (West Supp. 1984)). Most of the events discussed in this article focus on
the California WSRA before the 1982 amendments. For a detailed discussion of the amendments, see
infra notes 151-64 and accompanying text. Litigation surrounding the North Coast rivers revolved
around the pre-1982 statute. Where the amendments are relevant, however, they are included.
81. See supra notes 28-38 and accompanying text.
Washington Law Review Vol. 59:417, 1984
ment. 82 Under growing environmental pressure, the State Water Re-
sources Control Board has increasingly administered the system to im-
pose complex conditions on private, state, and federal water rights
permittees which are designed to incorporate environmental goals. In-
deed, the major emphasis of the state's water rights system in recent years
has been water quality. 83 Nevertheless, the legislature has never recog-
nized a right to appropriate water for instream flow. 84
The efforts 85 of the State Water Resources Control Board at achieving
instream protection have been augmented, sometimes pushed, by the Cal-
ifornia Department of Fish and Game which participates directly in the
water rights process. The Department recommends flow conditions, re-
lease requirements, and other features for State Water Resources Control
Board consideration in awarding or conditioning water appropriations
82. See generally R. DUNBAR. supra note 29 (discussing the evolving system and the continuing
importance of riparian doctrine in some areas).
83. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13,000-13,998 (West 1971 & Supp. 1984).
84. A state court recently ruled that to be valid in California an appropriation requires a diversion
or some physical manipulation of water flow. California Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control
Bd., 90 Cal. App. 3d 816, 153 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1979); Fullerton v. State Water Resources Control
Bd., 90 Cal. App. 3d 590, 153 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1979).
85. The legislature's primary purpose in creating the State Water Resources Control Board in
1967 was to integrate water quality concerns into the water rights process. See CAL. WATER CODE §
174 (West 1971). The legislature authorized the Board to deny an application on the grounds that no
water was available for appropriation, that an appropriation was not in the public interest, or that an
appropriator would have to make water releases-all in order to protect water quality. Id. §§
1250-1266 (West 1971 & Supp. 1984). The water quality effects of the Central Valley Project and
the State Water Project were a major reason why the State Water Resources Control Board tried to
regulate the federal project through the water rights system. In 1978, this attempt led the Supreme
Court to decide that Congress intended the Bureau of Reclamation to apply to the state for water
rights permits and to be governed by their requirements to any extent not inconsistent with federal
water project directives. See California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978). The authority of the
State Water Resources Control Board to allow appropriations is limited by other aspects of California
law. These include the "county of origin" statute, CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10,505-10,505.5 (West
1971), and the Delta Water Protection Act, id. §§ 11,454-11,460. Under these statutes, the areas of
natural water occurrence in the state have a prior right to supplies necessary for their development or
for preservation of certain baseline environmental conditions. These statutory limitations are ex-
panded by the common-law concept of the "public trust," a controversial doctrine that obliges the
state to protect public rights in flowing waters, tidelands, the beds of navigable lakes and streams,
fisheries, and possible other resources. See generally National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33
Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, (Mono Lake decision, discussing purpose and scope
of public trust doctrine and duties of state as trustee), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 413 (1983); State v.
Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d 210, 625 P.2d 239, 172 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1981) (applying public trust
doctrine to navigable streams); Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 259-60, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal.
Rptr. 790 (1971) (expanding public trust doctrine to tidelands); People v. Calfish Co., 166 Cal. 576,
598-99, 137 P. 799 (1913) (state retains right to enter land granted to private owners to preserve and
advance public uses); People v. Russ, 132 Cal. 102, 106, 64 P. 111, 112 (1901) (public trust doctrine
applies to non-navigable tributaries of navigable streams); People v. Gold Run Ditch & Mining Co.,
66 Cal. 138, 146-52, 4 P. 1152, 1155-57 (1884) (same). See generally Sax, The Public Trust Doc-
trine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).
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permits. 86 The Regional Water Quality Control Boards,87 the Department
of Forestry, and the Board of Forestry 88 are also important actors in this
process. A 1977 order of the State Water Resources Control Board re-
marked on the disagreements which have arisen between state water qual-
ity and forestry regulation:
The method and manner of logging is specifically regulated by the Cali-
fornia Division of Forestry pursuant to the Forest Practice Act and the Rules
of Forest Practice. The [North Coast] Regional [Water Quality Control]
Board should continue its cooperative efforts with the Division to provide
water quality information in the timber harvest plan review process. How-
ever, when the rules of Forest Practice and timber harvest plan occasionally
do not afford the degree of water quality protection required by the Porter-
Cologne Water Quality Control Act, the Regional Board must act to provide
such protection. 89
At the same time, the two agencies have cooperated to address the silta-
tion effects of logging in North Coast streams, evincing generally the
same spectrum of "state" goals and positions as was observed at the fed-
eral level.
Cooperation between state and federal land-managing agencies in wa-
ter quality protection has also been administratively encouraged. Al-
though the United States Supreme Court ruled in 1976 that a state could
not require a federal installation to comply with its administration of the
federal water pollution laws, 90 a 1978 Executive Order requires consulta-
tion and cooperation whenever "appropriate. "91 This order applies only
86. The California Department of Fish and Game has also been an antagonist to the water rights
process by filing suit against the Board to compel it to issue a public permit for preserving instream
flows. Although the Department lost this bid, it retains independent authority to review all alterations
to stream channels and beds. No state or private applicant may proceed with construction until the
Department determines that fish and wildlife will not be adversely affected or until the applicant
agrees to adopt Department mitigation measures. CAL. FiSH & GAME CODE §§ 1601-1607 (West 1971
& Supp. 1984).
87. The regional water quality boards operate under the authority provided by the 1969 Porter-
Cologne Water Quality Act, CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13,000-13,998 (West 1958 & Supp. 1984), and
implement the "point source" regulatory program required by the federal water pollution control
laws. They are also involved in developing "best management practices" for timber harvesting and
other "nonpoint" activities affecting water quality. Id. §§ 13370, 13377.
88. Under the Z'berg-Nejedly State Forest Practice Act of 1973, CAL. PUB. Ras. CODE §§
4511-4628 (West Supp. 1984), the Board of Forestry formulates "forest practice rules" which in-
clude sensitive logging practices for streamside protection zones and "special treatment areas." Id.
§§ 4551-4562.7. In addition, every state and private logger must submit a "timber harvesting plan"
to the Department of Forestry for review. Id. §§ 4581-4582.
89. In re Petition of North Coast Environmental Center, Order of Cal. State Water Resources
Control Board, No. WQ 77-1 (Jan. 6, 1977).
90. Environmental Protection Agency v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd.,
426 U.S. 200 (1976).
91. "Whenever the [EPA] Administrator or the appropriate State, interstate, or local agency
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to point source regulation under the state's discharge permit system; how-
ever, it also provides a firmer basis for state water quality criteria to influ-
ence national forest and other land management practices affecting the
state's streams. 9
2
B. The California Wild and Scenic Rivers Act: Major Distinctions from
the Federal Counterpart
The California WSRA 93 is a near carbon copy of its federal predeces-
sor. There are, however, some potentially important differences. 94 For
example, unlike the federal WSRA, the original state Act did not allow
for a variety of responsible "administering agencies." The California
WSRA originally gave sole administrative responsibility to the Secretary
of Resources, 95 who delegated it to the Department of Fish and Game.
Governor Brown's appointments for the Resources Secretary position96
gave the program a predictable preservationist cast. It did not, however,
notifies an Executive agency that it is in violation of an applicable pollution control standard . ... the
Executive agency shall promptly consult with the notifying agency and provide for its approval a plan
to achieve and maintain compliance .... " Exec. Order No. 12,088, 14 WEEKLY COMP PRES DOC
1766, 1768 (Oct. 13, 1978).
92. In 1980, the California Water Resources Control Board said that "[c]oordinated planning by
the [North Coast] Regional [Water Quality Control] Board, the State Board of Forestry and the U.S.
Forest Service will ultimately lead to the development and implementation of better practices for
timber harvesting." CAL ST. WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BD & REGIONAL WATER QUALITY CON-
TROL BDS. WATER QUALITY/WATER RIGHTS; 1978-80 REPORT I 1. Besides forest practice regulations,
other state land management programs protect instream values. These include the State Land Com-
mission's control of trust lands, the State Department of Parks' administration of parks and recrea-
tional trails, and the Department of Boating and Waterways' support of water-based recreation. See
generally B. ANDREWS & M. SANSOME. WHO RUNS THE RIVERS? DAMS AND DECISIONS IN THE NEW
WEST (forthcoming in 1984). In addition, the California Coastal Commission regulates local develop-
ment along the coast, and the Williamson Act offers tax incentives for local farmland preservation.
Id.
93. CAL PUB RES CODE §§ 5093.50-69 (West Supp. 1984).
94. There are also obvious differences which seem trivial. For example, the California legisla-
tion contained several "'instant" rivers, but did not include provisions for study rivers that are found
in the federal statute. 16 U.S.C. § 1275 (1982). The state Act provides no protection for designated
or potential study rivers, nor does it require state agencies to consider potential wild and scenic rivers
as alternative uses in their planning activities. The state law's only reference to ongoing study is the
brief statement that "[o]ther rivers which qualify for inclusion in the system may be recommended to
the Legislature by the [Secretary of the Resources Agency]." CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 5093.54 (West
Supp. 1984). Second, it does not specifically require state administrators to consider geological, his-
torical, and cultural values. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. This omission could arguably
limit the rivers which are eligible under the state system, but it probably has little practical effect.
95. Cal. WSRA, ch. 1259, § 1, 1972 Cal. Stat. 2510 (repealed by Cal. WSRA Amendments, ch.
1481, § 13, 1982 Cal. Stat. 275): see also supra note 86 and accompanying text. But see infra note
97.
96. Governor Brown's first Resources Secretary, Claire T. Dedrick, was a former Sierra Club
officer and his second Secretary, Huey Johnson, was a founder of the Trust for Public Land.
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eliminate the need to coordinate with diverse agencies and interests:97 the
Act has a general consistency provision that requires all state and local
agencies-not just water development and adjacent land management
bodies as in the federal Act-to exercise their authority in accordance
with the Act. 98
Second, the California WSRA originally did not limit the acreage per
mile of "river area" which could be protected, as the federal WSRA
did. 99 This feature encouraged the state to set expansive management
boundaries in the North Coast region. These corridors, and the state's
recommended management practices for them, have been strongly op-
posed by the region's private landowners and federal land-managing
agencies, especially the United States Forest Service. 100
A final unique feature of the original California Act was the require-
ment that the legislature approve the Resources Agency's management
plans. 101 California's mandate for state legislative approval of plans be-
came the major question in deciding whether the North Coast rivers met
requirements in the federal Act pertaining to governor-nominated riv-
ers. 102
97. Under the amended Act, the authority for administering the designated rivers resides with the
state agencies that already manage those rivers. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 5093.58 (West Supp. 1984).
The Secretary of the Resources Agency is reduced to a role of coordinating state and agency adminis-
trations and performing studies of the river systems. Id. § 5093.60. However, because most of the
pertinent agencies are under the authority of the Secretary of the Resources Agency, this change may
be merely cosmetic. The state Act itself poses specific requirements for state agency management, as
well as a general guideline that state agencies manage designated rivers in a manner consistent with
the values of the California WSRA. Id. § 5093.61.
98. Id. §5093.61.
99. Compare id. § 5093.50 with 16 U.S.C. § 1274(b) (1982).
100. The 1982 amendments define the "immediate environments" of the river area as land that
is "immediately adjacent to" the river. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 5093.52(h) (West Supp. 1984). Ac-
cording to Patricia Wells, the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) attorney who helped draft the bill,-
the framers intended the new language to make the management areas narrower than the Resources
Agency's existing guidelines, which included all land between the ridgetops on either side to a desig-
nated river. Telephone interview with Patricia Wells, EDF attorney (Jan. 11, 1983) (notes on file
with the Washington Law Review). The 1982 amendments also reduce the importance of the manage-
ment corridors. They modify the requirement that the Resources Agency use a management plan to
administer the rivers, thereby making irrelevant the concept of a uniform management corridor. Each
agency that administers the law under the revised Act will use its own discretion, and not the manage-
ment areas defined by the Resources Agency to determine the reach of its management activities. See
CAL. PuB. Res. CODE §§ 5093.60, .62 (West Supp. 1984).
101. Cal. WSRA, Ch. 1259, § 1, 1972 Cal. Stat. 2510 (repealed by Cal. WSRA Amendments,
ch. 1481, § 10, 1982 Cal. Stat. 275). The 1982 amendments to the Act delete the requirement for
legislatively approved management plans. The amendments themselves set out management guide-
lines for some areas, see, e.g., CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 5093.68 (West Supp. 1984) (restricting timber
harvesting in "special treatment areas"); in others, the appropriate state and local agencies must
administer the rivers in a manner consistent with the state Act. Id. § 5093.6 1.
102. The federal WSRA has no comparable requirement: at least in the case of congressionally
included rivers, the administering agency need only publish its plans in the Federal Register and wait
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The California statute is distinguishable from its federal precursor. Al-
though at first the differences appeared minor, some have grown in signif-
icance as they have provided leverage points in the battles between river
protection and development priorities. Governor Brown's North Coast
proposals have become entangled in the state's stormy water politics, the
related jurisdictional disputes, and intense conflict among diverse state
and federal resource management institutions and priorities.
IV. THE FEDERALIZATION OF CALIFORNIA'S NORTH COAST
RIVERS: TRADING OFF RESOURCES VALUES AT THE
STATE AND FEDERAL LEVELS
Midstream in the environmental decade of the 1970's, the federal and
California river programs coexisted easily. For the most part, they cov-
ered different rivers. The federal system included only two: the middle
fork of the Feather, whose main stem had been dammed by the State Wa-
ter Project, and the north fork of the American, in portions not dammed
by the federal Central Valley Project. The United States Forest Service
administered the Feather River, while Congress ordered that both the De-
partments of the Interior and Agriculture administer the north fork of the
American River. 103
Until Governor Brown's proposal, there were no federally designated
rivers on the North Coast. The immense streams of the region were ad-
ministered entirely under the state system. These rivers included the Eel,
Trinity, Klamath, Smith, and their numerous tributaries. These rivers
carry twenty-five million acre-feet of surface water annually-nearly half
of the state's total-to the Pacific Ocean. 1 04 They drain humid, forested
country characterized by steep slopes and highly erodible soils, and carry
naturally high sediment loads. 105
90 days after they have been sent to Congress before they become effective. 16 U.S.C. § 1274(a)(3).
(21) (1982).
103. The federal system also contained two designated study rivers, the Kern, above an Army
Corps of Engineers dam, and the Tuolumne, which is also being considered for further hydroelectric
development by the City of San Francisco. In March 1983, FERC granted a preliminary permit for
investigation of the feasibility of constructing three dams in the last free running stretch (30 miles
through Tuolumne Canyon) of this 158-mile, heavily developed river. Personal interview with Brian
E. Gray, EDF attorney (Aug. 19, 1983) (notes on file with the Washington Law Reviev); see also
EDF. Testimony of the EDF Before the Subcommittee on Public Lands and Reserved Water of the
U.S. Senate Committe on Energy and Natural Resources in regard to S. 5 and S. 1515 (Aug. 10,
1983) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review).
104. 1 HERITAGE CONSERVATION & RECREATION SERV.. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR. FINAL EIS:
PROPOSED DESIGNATION OF FIVE CALIFORNIA RIVERS IN THE NATIONAL WILD AND SCENIC RIVERS SYS-
TEM 111-1 to 111-3 (1980) [hereinafter cited as FINAL EIS].
105. Id. at I11-34.
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All of the rivers except the Smith have been dammed. Because of this,
only specified portions of the Klamath, Trinity, and Eel Rivers were des-
ignated under the California Act. That same statute also ordered the De-
partment of Water Resources to reevaluate the water development poten-
tial of the Eel in 1984 and report to the legislature which "shall hold
public hearings to determine whether legislation should be enacted to de-
lete all or any segment of the river from the system." 1 06 The Smith River,
because of its pristine status, was included in the state system in toto with
"all its tributaries, from the Oregon-California state boundary to the Pa-
cific Ocean."1 07
By the end of the 1970's, resource conflicts throughout California in-
tensified along all fronts. Public support for environmental protection
crystallized in the state and remained strong into the 1980's. This senti-
ment was often portrayed in the context of the state's environmental ac-
tivists struggling against the opposite inclinations of federal agents. 108
The scenario unfolded in conflicts over water development, forestry,
offshore oil development, energy facility siting, and elsewhere. 109 How-
106. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 5093.54(d) (West Supp. 1984).
107. Id. § 5093.54(c). The state system also included two components not on the North Coast.
One was the north fork of the American River, which was also protected by WSRA. The other was
the lower American River which had been dammed by the Central Valley Project and was slated for
further development by the Bureau of Reclamation's controversial Auburn Dam. The lower Ameri-
can was included for its high recreation potential, which only existed because of flows created by an
upstream federal dam. Clearly, the lower American's inclusion reflects the same extension of preser-
vationist goals to lower priority environments as occurred in the wilderness movement. See S. DANA
& S. FAiRFAX. supra note 92, at 300-01. On the other hand, the designation reflects changes in both
public values and in the availability of natural areas for recreation uses.
108. See, e.g., San Francisco Chron., May 17, 1981, at A19, col. 1 (U.S. Interior Secretary
James Watt's opposition to environmental groups increases public support for those groups); Edito-
rial, San Francisco Chron., June 4, 1981, at 54, col. 1 (commenting on Secretary Watt's stand on
northern California's rivers). This image of the Reagan Administration may not be affected by the
change of Secretaries, from Watt to Clark, in the Department of the Interior.
109. In water development, the state challenged the Bureau of Reclamation through its water
rights process and tried to regulate numerous Central Valley Project units. These included Auburn
Dam on the lower American River; New Melones Dam on the Stanislaus River; and the Trinity River
Division, Shasta Dam, and other northern California units affecting water quality in the Delta. The
United States sued California, claiming that the federal reclamation laws did not allow the State
Water Resources Control Board to set conditions on water rights permits for the Bureau's New Me-
lones Dam on the Stanislaus River. United States v. California, 403 F. Supp. 874 (E.D. Cal. 1975),
affd, 558 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 438 U.S. 645 (1978), on remand, 509 F. Supp. 867
(E.D. Cal. 1981). The EDF tested essentially the same issue against a local Bureau water contractor
under state law. EDF v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 20 Cal. 3d 327, 572 P.2d 1128, 142 Cal. Rptr.
904 (1977), rev'd, 439 U.S. 811 (1978), on remand, 26 Cal. 3d 183, 605 P.2d 1, 161 Cal. Rptr. 466
(1980). Trinity County tested both state and federal law when it sued the Department of the Interior
directly, alleging environmentally destructive operation of the Trinity River Division during the
1976-77 drought. County of Trinity v. Andrus, 438 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Cal. 1977). In forestry,
California challenged the Forest Service on wilderness study procedures. California v. Bergland, 483
F. Supp. 465 (E.D. Cal. 1980).
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ever, awareness of resource shortages was growing: the 1976-77
drought, the economic woes of the timber industry, and unemployment
altered the context of the state's recreation and preservation programs.
California's legislature, although it had passed some of the country's
toughest environmental legislation in the 1970's, l" 0 refused to support,
and occasionally directly thwarted, a number of Brown Administration
maneuvers designed to save rivers. I"'
Nowhere were these conflicting public priorities more deeply felt by
Californians than in the debate over completion of the State Water Proj-
ect. A water development compromise approved by the legislature in
1980 authorized construction of the controversial Peripheral Canal to
transport water around the Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta."l 2 The
Canal was widely opposed by environmental and northern California
groups for two reasons: it symbolized the continued diversion of northern
California's water to the south while also potentially disturbing the ecol-
ogy and existing water supply of the Delta. Other groups, including sev-
eral putative beneficiaries, opposed the measure as well. Some major ag-
ricultural interests argued that the Canal cost too much and still would not
deliver adequate water. 113
The state legislature worked out a compromise which provided that the
Peripheral Canal and certain northern California dams would be permitted
in exchange for state constitutional language intended to provide protec-
tion for the Delta and the North Coast rivers. 114 Governor Brown signed
the compromise legislation on July 8, 1980.115
110. See, e.g., California Environmental Quality Act, CAL. PUB. REs CODE §§ 21.000-21,176
(West 1977 & Supp. 1984); Cal. WSRA, CAL. PUB REs. CODE §§ 5093.50-69 (West Supp. 1984).
11I. Even the public as a whole failed to follow the Administration's lead. For example, despite
the State Water Resources Control Board's position against the Bureau of Reclamation on the New
Melones Dam. a 1974 effort to vote the Stanislaus River into the state's Wild and Scenic Rivers
System by public initiative failed. L.A. Times, Nov. 7, 1974, at 24, col. 8 (failure of the Wild Rivers
Initiative, Cal. Proposition 17).
112. Act of July 18, 1980, ch. 632, 1980 Cal. Stat. 1723 (codified in scattered sections of CAL.
WATER CODE). The Sacramento River from the north and the San Joaquin River from the south flow
into the delta and then westward to the Pacific Ocean through San Francisco Bay.
113. Andrews & Fairfax, supra note 29. Although it was originally a co-sponsor, the high costs
and deep divisions led Congress to withdraw authority for federal participation in the Peripheral Ca-
nal. Environmental groups found themselves in court arguing against the state on the basis of federal
law. The Sierra Club had claimed that the 1899 Rivers and Harbor Act required the state to get a
federal permit for the Peripheral Canal from the Army Corps of Engineers. In 1981, the United States
Supreme Court denied the group standing under the Act, and the controversy remained a political
one. Sierra Club v. California, 451 U.S. 287 (1981).
114. The state's water development statute, Act of July 18, 1980, ch. 632, 1980 Cal. Stat. 1733
(codified in scattered sections of CAL. WATER CODE), was accompanied by a constitutional amend-
ment which would require a public vote before any existing safeguards for the Delta and the rivers
could be weakened. A two-thirds legislative vote would be required for alterations which did not
diminish existing levels of protection. "A resolution to propose to the people of the state of Califor-
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A. California's Requestfor Federal Designation
At the same time that Governor Brown embraced the compromise, he
threw it away. Immediately after ceremoniously signing the compromise
bill, he asked Secretary Andrus to consider an administrative proposal
placing 4000 miles of state-protected rivers into the national wild and
scenic rivers system. Governor Brown made no mention of this pending
move in his speech at the signing of the compromise legislation. 116
Governor Brown's request was a total surprise; it was preceded by no
consultation with affected resource users of localities and, therefore, ap-
peared underhanded. More importantly, it affected an immense range of
human lives and resource values in the North Coast region. It was greeted
by an immediate public stir. Although it appeared that different interests
were lining up to support different levels of government, the conflict be-
tween federal and state laws was confused by the fact that initially the
federal and state governments were on the same side. The conflicting
laws simply provided the format in which traditionally opposed and allied
groups vied.
1. The Private Interests
The timber industry led the opposition. Timber interests feared that
federal designation would create another layer of restrictions on logging
activities while, at the same time, tightening the timber management re-
quirements on federal lands.l17 Mining ventures were also threatened by
the designation. 118 However, because state laws already greatly restricted
nia an amendment to the Constitution of the state, by adding Article A relating to water," A.C.A. 90
(Apr. 10, 1980).
115. Governor Brown lavishly praised the key legislators who "steered this bill through its very
tortuous passage. It's been a long time in coming. I think it is a reasonable balance of the competing
interests." Remarks by Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., at the signing of Cal. S. 200, July 18,
1980, reprinted in CAL. DEPT OF WATER RESOURCES. THE CAL. STATE WATER PROJECT-CURRENT
AcrlVMES AND FUTURE MANAGEMENT PLANS. Bull. 132-80, at 33, 36 (1980). A diverse group of
opponents to the bill disagreed. See supra text accompanying note 113. They were successful in
having it put on the ballot for public consideration in June 1982. Proposition 9, supporting the canal
and attendant measures, was defeated by a two-to-one majority. For a full discussion of Proposition 9
and attendant phenomena, see B. ANDREWS & M. SANSOME. supra note 92.
116. Governor Brown's only mention of federal involvement in the state's programs was that he
was "expressly asking the Federal Government to join in a massive conservation program" involving
water resources throughout the state. Remarks by Governor Edmund Brown, Jr., supra note 115, at
36. In the final paragraph of his speech, he made a cryptic reference to "federal guarantees of our
wild rivers." Id.
117. Written statement of Robert B. Hoover, President, Cal. Forest Protective Ass'n reprinted in
2 FINAL EIS, supra note 102, at VI-238, -240, -246.
118. The federal WSRA restricted mining pursuant to Interior of Agriculture regulations and
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mining in the area,1 19 the mining industry was less actively opposed than
the timber companies. The timber interests were supported by the local
North Coast counties of Del Norte, Trinity, Siskiyou, and Humboldt, all
of which feared the economic impacts and loss of local tax base which
might result from further decline of the timber industry. 120 Rounding out
the opposition were water developers from the southern part of the state
who feared that federal designation would foreclose use of the enormous
untapped water resources of the region, particularly the Eel River. 121
Lining up in favor of designation were the fishing industry, recreation
groups, and environmentalists. Fishing groups wanted the designation in
order to restrict timber operations in the area, 122 which they believed had
contributed to erosion, water pollution, and the subsequent decline in the
region's fisheries. 123 Recreation and environmental groups favored fed-
eral designation because they hoped it would slow or stop development in
riparian areas and enhance protection of the natural beauty of the area. 124
Electric power interests have been conspicuous by their absence from
the controversy. Public utilities and small energy entrepreneurs alike have
flooded state and federal licensing agencies with applications to build or
extend hydroelectric power plants in northern California. 125 In response
to federal laws requiring utilities to buy locally generated power at the
replacement rate, 126 investors with one to five million dollars began to
construct their own hydroelectric facilities. This enthusiastic response to
the new statutory goals may abate as experience repeatedly demonstrates
prohibited mining within one-quarter mile of any river designated as "wild" or considered for poten-
tial inclusion in the national system. 16 U.S.C. § 1280 (1982).
119. CAL PuB. RES CODE § 5093.66 (West Supp. 1984).
120. See infra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
121. Reporter's transcript at 49-54 (June 16, 1981), Del Norte v. United States, No. C-81-
0567WAI (N.D. Cal.); see infra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
122. Although a significant local industry, fishing, would be enhanced by wild and scenic river
designation, the local counties were initially moved to side with the timber companies for two rea-
sons. First, timber companies own land and pay property tax. Second, when federal lands are
harvested, the Forest Service distributes 35% of the gross revenues to the states and localities under a
variety of revenue sharing programs. See ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS.
THE ADEQUACY OF FEDERAL COMPENSATION TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR TAX EXEMPT FEDERAL
LANDS 19 (1978).
123. DEPARTMENT OF FISH & GAME, CAL. RESOURCES AGENCY, SMITH RIVER DRAFT MANAGE-
MENT WATERWAY PLAN 192-96 (1980) [hereinafter cited as SMITH RIVER DRAFT PLAN].
124. See generally comments from representative conservation groups published in 2 FINAL EIS,
supra note 104, pt. VI.
125. Telephone interview with David Sabiston, Supervising Engineer, Division of Water Rights,
State Water Rights Control Bd., Sacramento, California (Nov. 15, 1982) (notes on file with the
Washington Law Review).
126. The Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2645 (1982).
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that licensing still takes considerable time and expense, 127 or as changes
in the energy economy discourage small investors. Nevertheless, the ab-
sence of electric power interests from the dispute is noteworthy. One offi-
cial at the Water Rights Division of the State Water Resources Control
Board has suggested that both large and small hydrodevelopers have
agreed not to build any plants on state-designated streams. 128 This exhibi-
tion of coherence and forebearance is surprising for such a diverse group.
Because it is not clear that FERC licensing authority would be impeded
by state designations alone,129 the activity of hydropower developers and
their apparent hands-off policy is difficult to explain.
2. The Federal Reaction
Governor Brown's request to Secretary Andrus shifted many wheels
into high gear. The adversely affected resource interests went to court.
Less predictable perhaps, the Department of the Interior and the Califor-
nia Resources Agency worked in an unusually cooperative spirit. Both
state and federal proponents foresaw that the designation process might
have to be completed before a possible change of federal administration
in January 1981. In July 1980, reelection of Presidint Carter was unsure,
and a new administration might not continue to grease the skids under the
designation proposal. 130
Work on the draft environmental impact statement (EIS) began on Au-
gust 1 and was completed within a month. 131 The Heritage Conservation
and Recreation Service (HCRS) coordinated the Department of the Inte-
rior effort. It included in the draft a ninety-page river management pro-
posal which had been prepared by the California Resources Agency. It
was part of an effort to demonstrate that California in fact had authority to
"permanently administer" the rivers as required for inclusion under the
127. See Rios, California's Love Affair with Small Hydropower Plants, CAL. J., Feb. 1981, at
82.
128. Telephone interview with David Sabiston, supra note 125.
129. FERC authority to license projects on state wild and scenic rivers presents complex issues,
discussed infra at notes 212-15 and accompanying text.
130. Under § 2(a)(ii) of the federal WSRA, the Secretary of the Interior had to find that the North
Coast rivers met federal eligibility criteria and that the state had a commitment to permanently ad-
minister them. 16 U.S.C. § 1273(a)(ii) (1982). Secretary Andrus also had to prepare an Environmen-
tal Impact Statement (EIS) under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) before he could act.
The California Resources Agency had already prepared draft waterway management plans for the
Smith River, several tributaries of the other North Coast rivers, and the lower American and north
fork American rivers. Although none of these had been approved by the legislature, they provided a
sizable data base on which federal river evaluation and impact analysis could proceed. The California
Resources Agency's data and zeal gave it a major role in the federal NEPA process.
131. The National Park Service has assumed the functions of the abolished Heritage Conserva-
tion and Recreation Service (HCRS).
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federal Act despite the absence of legislative approval of management
plans 132 specified by the state statute. Public meetings on the draft were
held in late October of 1980, and a final environmental impact statement
was filed with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on December
12, 1980.133 Federal regulations require a thirty-day waiting period after
the EPA publishes notice of a final environmental impact statement in the
Federal Register before a decision can be made on the analyzed action. 134
Any delay would foreclose action by the defeated Carter Administration.
3. The Designation Decision
The environmental impact statement was reformulated into a briefer
issue document for the Secretary and the Assistant Secretaries to as-
sess. 135 The debate within the department was similar to the controversy
elsewhere, 36 for participants therein reflected virtually all the affected
interests in the North Coast controversy. 137 For example, the Assistant
Secretary for Energy and Minerals looked to the minerals potential of the
Smith River area and opposed the federal designation altogether, 138 while
132. CAL RESOURCES AGENCY. CALIFORNIA ADMINISTRATION OF THOSE RIVERS INCLUDED IN THE
STATE'S REQUEST FOR NATIONAL WILD AND SCENIC RIVERS DESIGNATION (1980), reprinted in FINAL
EIS. supra note 104 app. E.
133. FINAL EIS, supra note 104.
134. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.10 (1983) (timing of agency action for EPA).
135. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR. SECRETARIAL ISSUE DOCUMENT. CALIFORNIA RIVERS APPLICA-
TION (1981) [hereinafter cited as SECRETARIAL ISSUE DOCUMENT].
136. Fairfax & Andrews, Debate With and Debate Without: NEPA and the Redefinition of the
"Prudent Matt" Rule, 19 NAT_ RESOURCES J. 505 (1979).
137. The positions of the different Assistant Secretaries of the Interior ranged from conservative
to moderate views. None endorsed California's proposal to include all 4000 river miles. The Assis-
tant Secretary for Energy and Minerals favored the status quo. If any rivers would be designated, this
Assistant Secretary wanted the Smith River entirely excluded due to its mineral potential. He also
wanted all other river segments involving the national forests left out. Memorandum from Assistant
Secretary-Energy and Minerals, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, to Director, Executive Secretariat (Jan.
8, 1981) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review). Three Assistant Secretaries (Fish, Wildlife,
and Parks; Land and Water; and Policy, Budget, and Administration) preferred protecting 1018 river
miles and putting 228 miles of the Smith River in study status. Memorandum from Robert L. Herbst,
Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and Parks, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, to Executive Secre-
tary (Jan. 9, 1981) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review); Memorandum from Assistant
Secretary-Policy, Budget and Administration, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, to Executive Secretariat
(Jan. 12, 1981) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review). The Assistant Secretary for Indian
Affairs, who came closest to the Brown concept favored excluding much of the Smith River but
protecting 1246 total North Coast river miles. Memorandum from Assistant Secretary-Indian Af-
fairs, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, to Executive Secretary (Jan. 9, 1981) (copy on file with the Wash-
ington Law Review).
138. Memorandum from Assistant Secretary-Energy and Minerals, U.S. Dep't of the Interior,
to Director, Executive Secretariat, supra note 137.
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the Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs supported the most expansive
designation alternative. 139
The United States Forest Service was only indirectly involved in the
decision. The Secretary of Agriculture, whose responsibilities include the
Forest Service, participated in the Department of the Interior's internal
deliberations. 140 Regional and local Forest Service personnel charged
with managing the vast majority of the effected land felt estranged from a
process which took place primarily in Sacramento, California. 141 Predict-
ably, the Secretary of Agriculture supported his own "team" and voted
for the option which excluded all river segments bordering on national
forests. The Department of Agriculture couched its opposition to the Inte-
rior Department's activities 142 as a concern for planning. The Secretary of
Agriculture argued that the rapid environmental impact statement process
had completely shortcircuited the mandatory United States Forest Service
planning and environmental impact procedures. The Secretary of Agri-
culture wrote to the Secretary of Interior on January 12, 1981:
The proposal would likely have major impacts on output from the National
Forests in northern California .... [T]he impacts on the multiple resources
of the National Forest lands could not be adequately assessed in the abbrevi-
ated time .... The planning now underway on the National Forest System
lands, in accordance with the National Forest Management Act of 1976,
will comprehensively examine all resources tributary to the rivers in the
context with the adjacent public and private lands. Any action to fragment
the decision resulting from the Forest planning process would be premature
and undesirable. 143
The Secretary of the Interior took a moderate path and embraced the
alternative recommended by the interdisciplinary team which drafted the
environmental impact statement. 144 All of the state's requested rivers
139. Memorandum from Assistant Secretary-Indian Affairs, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, to Ex-
ecutive Secretary, supra note 137.
140. Under the congressional inclusion procedure of WSRA, the Department of Agriculture
would have been the lead river study agency. This is because national forest lands were so heavily
involved in designations, particularly along the Smith. However, under the state-proposed option (§
2(a)(ii) of WSRA), the Department of the Interior is the lead agency regardless of how much national
forest land is involved. 16 U.S.C. § 1273(a)(ii) (1982). Because Governor Brown proposed the North
Coast inclusions, it was the HCRS which conducted the EIS process and the Secretary of the Interior
who judged the rivers' eligibility.
141. Telephone interview with Jon Kennedy, U.S. Forest Serv., Pacific Southwest Region (Mar.
15, 1982) (notes on file with the Washington Law Review).
142. For a discussion of long standing Agriculture/Interior friction, see S. DANA & S. FAIRFAX,
supra note 92, at 151-55.
143. Letter from Bob Bergland, Secretary, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, to Cecil D. Andrus, Sec-
retary, U.S. Dep't of the Interior (Jan. 12, 1981) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review).
144. 1 FINAL EIS, supra note 104, atIV-90 to -104.
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were fully included in the national system except for the Smith and a mi-
nor alteration on the Klamath. 145
The major feature of the Secretary's decision was exclusion of most of
the Smith River. The environmental impact statement had found 2760
miles of the Smith and its tributaries ineligible for inclusion in the na-
tional system. These extensive segments were not ineligible because they
lacked wild and scenic values. Rather, they were deemed ineligible in the
environmental impact statement because of the effects which inclusion
would have on timber harvesting in the Six Rivers National Forest. 46 The
Secretary chose to agree with the environmental impact statement and to
include only 376 miles of the Smith. Those miles were chosen on the
basis of their outstanding anadromous fishery values. The Secretary went
a significant step further, however: not only did he exclude much of the
Smith but he also classified many of the included segments as recrea-
tional. Administration of the segments classified as wild would preclude
timber harvesting and mining, while a recreational classification would
not. The Secretary even avoided the middle "scenic" category which,
under the federal guidelines then being polished for proposal, could have
imposed special silvicultural and road-building requirements. 147
In rejecting most of the Smith River as ineligible, the Secretary did not
judge wild and scenic values on the basis of the river's present, undevel-
oped status. Some segments were excluded because of imminent develop-
ment, such as the California Nickel Company's cobalt mining operation
along Hardscrabble Creek. For the most part, however, the Secretary
looked to the resource development potential of the river. He then justi-
fied deletion on the basis of the fishery values of the included miles, im-
plying that the deletions lacked such superlative assets. At the same time,
in his letter of decision to Governor Brown, he acknowledged that:
With regard to the smaller tributaries of the Smith River which were not
deemed eligible for the National System, but which California chose to put
into its State system, we recognize that the high water quality of those tribu-
taries is essential to maintaining the outstandingly remarkable anadromous
fishery resource of the rivet system. We expect that the State and the U.S.
145. The Klamath alteration simply started the designation about half a mile further downstream
from a FERC project than the state had requested. Office of the Sec'y. U.S. Dep't of the Interior.
Notice of Approval for Inclusion in the Wild and Scenic Rivers System as State Administered Com-
ponents 2 (Jan. 19. 1981).
146. I FINAL EIS, supra note 104, at IV-90.
147. HCRS., U.S. Dep't of the Interior, National Wild and Scenic Rivers System: Draft Revised
Guidelines For Eligibility, Classification and Management of River Areas, 46 Fed. Reg. 9148, 9154
(1981) [hereinafter cited as HCRS Draft Guidelines].
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Forest Service will take all necessary steps to sustain and possibly improve
their present quality. 148
The Secretary's decision was a careful political compromise. It satis-
fied the state and the environmental groups without overly disrupting the
timber and mining industries. The Smith deletions were surprisingly well-
masked by the overall enormity of the North Coast inclusions. Popular
accounts made little distinction between including some or all of the
Smith. They also failed to appreciate the fact-too fine for the public eye,
yet potentially critical for on-the-ground resource management-that the
Secretary had classified many of the Smith's included segments as recrea-
tional. What hit the press was the flashy story that the Secretary had de-
cided to put five rivers, the Smith, Klamath, Trinity, Eel, and lower
American, into the national wild and scenic rivers system.
The inclusions did impose costs on the resource development side. The
north fork of the Eel-the only other river region where the United States
Forest Service estimated adverse effects on timber harvesting-was in-
cluded in full, with most of its mileage classified as wild. Inclusion of the
middle fork of the Eel also put water users' long-shot hopes for develop-
ing that river149 virtually beyond reach. These were all real impacts of
federal designation which angered resource interests and made the move
appear bold in the aggregate. The Secretary of the Interior signed his de-
cision letter to Governor Brown only hours before he left office. The
magnitude of the decision and the unusually rapid environmental impact
statement process which preceded it opened the federal designation to
court attack.
Although the successful effort to produce a draft EIS in a month and a
final decision in five months is just short of astounding, it is difficult to
point to the process as a touchstone of federal-state cooperation. Key par-
ticipants were absent. That raises doubts about the future of river manage-
ment and points again to weaknesses in federalism theory when it is not
possible to identify the federal or state position.
The most notable cooperation took place between the California Re-
sources Agency and the Department of the Interior regarding the analysis
of the Governor's proposal. However, the United States Forest Service,
which manages a vast proportion of the affected river corridors, was ex-
cluded-one could almost say conspired against. That marginal players
could and did cooperate to file papers seems less important than the fact
148. Letter from Cecil D. Andrus, Secretary, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, to Governor Edmund G.
Brown, Jr. (Jan. 19, 1981) (emphasis added) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review). Again,
the emphasis on the Forest Service and the absence of a reference to FERC is surprising. See infra
notes 212-15 and accompanying text.
149. See ifra note 198 and accompanying text.
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that the single most important agency in the conflict did not. Indeed, it
could be argued that the major result of the cooperation was to minimize
or evade procedures laboriously evolved during the last decade to facili-
tate thorough analysis and public evaluation of resource management pro-
grams. 150
This does not demonstrate that cooperation is bad, but suggests that it
is not necessarily good either. The North Coast Rivers EIS also gives
hope to those who fear that such undertakings must by their very nature
take years; that is clearly not the case. But neither is the speedy produc-
tion of a bureaucratic boilerplate the touchstone of federal-state interac-
tion. Further, although there was obvious cooperation between selected
agencies, that did not mean that federal and state levels of government
were cooperating. River preservation is too complex, encompassing too
many overlapping and conflicting mandates and too many agencies at all
levels of government, to be usefully characterized as cooperative. Like
the idea of federal-state conflict, the idea of cooperation rests on the as-
sumption that there are federal and state positions which can be repre-
sented each by an agency and which can be harmonized by their mutual
efforts. The North Coast rivers conflict, once again, suggests the con-
trary. The pattern of priorities and interactions is complex and constantly
evolving.
B. Beyond Designation: The Constantly Changing Meaning of
Inclusion
Not unexpectedly, therefore, the meaning of the North Coast designa-
tion has also been continually shifting. Governor Brown's original pro-
posal did not look like the final designation approved by Secretary An-
drus. But Secretary Andrus' decision did not freeze the issue; the target is
still moving. Each of the interested parties pressed its claims in institu-
tional arenas where it believed that it held an advantage: in the courts, in
federal and state legislatures, and in the regulation writing process. All of
this advocacy was further complicated by the changes in the executive
branches: first in Washington, D.C. and then in Sacramento. None of this
shifting, multifaceted debate fits usefully into traditional models of fed-
eralism: neither the alliances nor the antagonisms are stable, and govern-
150. Industry, at least, claims that NEPA 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). has
been circumscribed. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgment at 60, County of Del Norte v. United States, No. C-81-0567 WAI (N.D. Cal.
filed Mar. 1981). Plaintiffs in Del Norte also assert that federal-state cooperation has shortcircuited
requirements in WSRA, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (1982); see infra notes 237-45 and accompanying
text.
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ment agencies and officials frequently resemble private sector advocates.
They pursue their own unique priorities and do not act as exemplars of
broader state or national interests.
1. California: The Wild and Scenic Rivers Amendments
One by-product of the North Coast designation controversy was that
the California legislature finally moved to amend its statute. 151 It has al-
ready been noted that there was never a single state position on the issue.
Throughout eight years of the Brown Administration, the wild rivers pro-
gram was intensely controversial. The Resources Agency battled the state
assembly, the timber industry, and the North Coast counties in order to
try to draft and implement management plans. The Agency produced four
plans, all of which appeared to cut back severely on timber harvest. Only
one went to the legislature, and that was flatly rejected. The other three
engendered so much opposition from the counties that they were never
submitted to the assembly for approval. 152
Long before the North Coast designation controversy erupted, several
legislators were at work on amendments. Three years of intensive negoti-
ations among timber interests, the counties, the Governor, and the Re-
sources Agency led to California Assembly Bill 1349,153 popularly
known as the Bosco Bill for its major sponsor. Environmentalists initially
opposed the bill because they feared it would open up more land to har-
vest and endanger the North Coast rivers designation. 154 However, the
bill passed after another year of protracted negotiations in the full heat of
the North Coast controversy. 155 Environmentalists, led by the Environ-
mental Defense Fund, recognized the need to make the California wild
and scenic rivers program less antagonistic toward the forest products in-
dustry. In part, the environmentalists hoped that the timber industry
would conclude that state administration under the Act was less threaten-
ing than before and would drop the lawsuit that the industry had initiated
on North Coast river designation. Environmentalists also realized that
some form of the bill would pass, and they wanted to make it as palatable
as they could. 156
151. See infra note 155.
152. See Berthelson, Bill to Alter Wild Rivers Act to Face Troubled Waters, Sacramento Bee,
June 1, 1981, at AI2, col. 1.
153. Cal. A.B. 1349, 1981-82 Reg. Sess. (1981).
154. See Berthelson, Panel OKs Revised State Wild Rivers Act, Sacramento Bee, June 3, 1981,
at AI2, col. 1.
155. Ch. 1481, §§ 1-20, 1982 Cal. Stat. 262-80 (codified at CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§
5093.50-.69 (West Supp. 1984)).
156. Telephone interview with Patricia Wells, supra note 100. It also seems reasonable to sup-
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The amendments, as enacted, made three basic changes in the Califor-
nia Act. First, they eliminated the requirement for management plans by
the Secretary of Resources. 157 It is not clear which, if any, of the conten-
ders were advantaged by that provision. Under Governor Brown's admin-
istration, the management plans were highly protective of the rivers and
posed a threat to timber companies and the North Coast counties. 1 58 But
the legislature's longstanding refusal to approve management plans when
presented constituted a strong argument that federal inclusion of the
North Coast rivers was not authorized; hence, elimination of plans from
the state program could affect the outcome of litigation. Moreover, if the
state was ever again to propose federal designation for its rivers, the ab-
sence of a state requirement for management plans might ease federal
approval.
The different groups' calculations of their advantages under the new
provision were altered by changes in both federal and state administra-
tions. After President Reagan took office, the timber industry was per-
haps less concerned about federal approval of additional state-proposed
rivers. Conversely, when Governor Brown was replaced by the appar-
ently more pro-development Governor George Deukmejian two years la-
ter, the environmentalist perception of state management priorities may
have become less optimistic.
The Bosco Bill's second major alteration of the original Act was to
remove authority for river administration from the Secretary of Re-
sources. The amendments give the legislature, not the Resources Secre-
tary, the power to classify rivers as wild, scenic, or recreational. 159 The
bill also deleted all references to the Secretary administering the Act,
leaving administrative responsibility with agencies that already manage
the rivers. 160 Under the amended Act, the Secretary's duties are limited to
studying the rivers and the California system, and to coordinating the ef-
forts of state and federal agencies. 161
The impact of these provisions on the contenders may not be as sweep-
ing as it seemed when they were first passed. Most of the state agencies
that manage rivers and their adjacent land areas are contained within the
Resources Agency; therefore, the Secretary still has ultimate authority
pose that the Andrus decision had refocused the environmentalists' efforts somewhat, away from an
effort to control timber harvesting and increasingly toward thwarting FERC efforts to authorize hydro
developments in the area. See infra notes 212-15 and accompanying text.
157. CAt PUB Rts CODEt §§ 5093.58-.60 (West Supp. 1984) (repealing ch, 1259, § 1. 1972
Cal. Stat. 2510. 2513).
158. See. e.g., SsMi RIVER DRAFT PLAN. supra note 123.
159. CAl PUB REs Com: §§ 5093.546, ,58 (West Supp. 1984).
160. Id. §§ 5093 60-.62 (repealing ch 1259, § 1, 1972 Cal. Stat. 2510. 2513).
161. CAl PUB REs CODE§§5093.60..69(WestSupp. 1984).
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over river administration in spite of the change. Governor Deukmejian
chose a Resources Secretary who has a less explicitly defined orientation
than former Secretary Huey Johnson. As Resources Secretaries and their
approaches to river management continue to vary, prediction of the
amendment's long-term and short-term consequences will become
exceedingly risky.
The final change in the Act is the redefinition of management bounda-
ries. Under the original Act, state agencies sought to preserve the rivers
and their "immediate environments." 162 Governor Brown's Resources
Secretary interpreted this langauge broadly as authority to administer all
land between the ridgetops on either side of the rivers. The new language
narrows this definition: "immediate environments" means "the land im-
mediately adjacent to" the designated river segments.163 Participants in
the process assumed that the change would limit the scope of state man-
agement to the same extent as federal management under the federal Act,
or about 320 acres per river mile. 164
This provision should please the timber industry and the counties, but,
once again, the immediate impact may be minor. With a change of ad-
ministration in the Resources Agency, the timber industry would proba-
bly have found the state's management policies more acceptable, even
without the narrower river corridors.
Throughout the negotiations on the Bosco Bill, affected interests had to
balance their long-term goals for the wild and scenic rivers programs
against the immediate concerns of the North Coast litigation. These com-
plex assessments were confounded by the fact that the state program was
not the only one in flux. A new administration in Washington, D.C.,
picked up the loose ends of long-pending changes in federal wild and
scenic river management guidelines and put a new emphasis on long-dis-
cussed amendments to the federal Act.
2. The Federal Agencies: New Regulatory Guidelines
The new final guidelines for wild and scenic river management promul-
gated in late 1981 by the Reagan Administration essentially reorganize
old guidelines in force since 1970.165 However, the new guidelines are
162. Id. § 5093.50.
163. Id. § 5093.52(h).
164. Telephone interview with Patricia Wells, supra note 100.
165. For the original guidelines, see U.S. Dep'ts of the Interior and Agriculture, Guidelines for
Evaluating Wild and Recreational River Areas Proposed for Inclusion in the National Wild and
Scenic Rivers System Under Section 2, Pub. L. No. 90-542 (as amended) (1970) [hereinafter cited as
1970 Guidelines]. For the new guidelines, see Guidelines for Eligibility, Classification and Manage-
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very different from a set drafted over a two-to-four-year period by the
Carter administration and published for public comment just after Secre-
tary Andrus left the Department. Thus, the changes in guidelines between
1970 and 1981 were slight. However, the changes from 1978-80 to 1981
were dramatic, demonstrating once again how difficult it is to speak about
"the" federal position.
The Reagan revisions simply finished an effort begun under President
Carter to revise the program. The Heritage Conservation and Recreation
Service (HCRS) worked for two years developing draft guidelines which
would tighten the 1970 version. 166 Those proposed Carter guidelines
were published in draft form on January 28, 1981, less than ten days after
the Reagan Administration took office. After extensive public comments,
the Departments of the Interior and Agriculture revised the final guide-
lines so that they were similar to the 1970 version.
The Reagan guidelines rejected the Carter Administration's effort to
redefine "wild" rivers to include areas where minor dams and other in-
conspicuous or "historical" or "cultural" structures existed. 167 More-
over, the new guidelines follow the 1970 regulations by relying on the
language of the Act to define river management criteria. 168 Specific water
quality standards, mining prohibitions, restrictions on dams, and controls
on federal appropriation of land and water included in the Carter team
draft were eliminated in the final version. The Carter language also al-
lowed "selective timber harvest" 169 in scenic river areas, while the final
allows "timber harvest."' 170 Although the regulations are ostensibly a
joint product of the Departments of Agriculture and the Interior, it would
be a serious error to assume that the guidelines presage a uniform federal
approach to the program. The provisions are suggestive rather than bind-
ing, and offer ample room for exercise of discretion by diverse agencies
operating under significantly different mandates.
ment of River Areas, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,454 (1982) [hereinafter cited as 1982 Guidelines).
166. HCRS Draft Guidelines, supra note 145, 46 Fed. Reg. at 9149.
167. Id. at 9152-53.
168. 1982 Guidelines, supra note 163, 47 Fed. Reg. at 39,458. The management section of the
1982 Guidelines begins with General Management Principles, § 10(a). The HCRS Draft Guidelines,
supra note 147, however, incorporated management principles that "are found in or stem from"
WSRA, 46 Fed. Reg. at 9154, as well as § 10(a)'s General Management Principles, 46 Fed. Reg. at
9155.
169. HCRS Draft Guidelines, supra note 147, 46 Fed. Reg. at 9156.
170. 1982 Guidelines, supra note 165, 47 Fed. Reg. at 39,459.
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3. The Reagan Administration: Amending the Federal Act
Reagan Administration efforts to put its own stamp' 7' on long-pending
proposals to amend the federal Act constitute a final impediment to identi-
fying the federal position on wild and scenic rivers. The proposed legisla-
tive amendments are in keeping with major administration policies. For
example, they may reduce the federal government's ability to purchase
land for river protection, 172 and allow the federal government to sell the
land as long as the Interior Department includes in the sale restrictions
preserving the values under the Act. 173
The proposed amendments also address state requests to designate riv-
ers, the issue raised by the North Coast controversy. They would require
concurrent resolution by the state governor and the state legislature before
the Secretary could consider a designation proposal under section 2(a)(ii)
of the Act, 174 and would allow a state legislature to request the Secretary
of the Interior for a revocation of designation. 175 Proposed changes in the
Act would also require federal agencies with jurisdiction over five percent
of the lands adjacent to the proposed rivers to approve the designation
decision. 176
4. Summary
In a very short period of time, the North Coast controversy became
extremely complex. Standard federalism models are misleading because
the basic ingredients are missing; it is impossible to identify either a fed-
eral or a state position. An initial complication was the fact that the ex-
traordinary cooperation between the California Resources Agency and the
Department of the Interior was motivated, in significant part, by conflict
between the same state agency and a different federal one-the United
States Forest Service. 177 In addition, many of the significant players and
almost all the ground rules were in a constant flux. Exploiting and creat-
ing these changes, the interest groups are an important part of changing
the pattern. Although a fairly standard split between preservation and de-
velopment is obvious, it is only slightly more useful in describing the
interactions than the federal sovereign versus state sovereign concept. It
171. WSRA Amendments, White House Press Release (Sept. 13, 1982) [hereinafter cited as
Press Release] (copy on file with the Washington Law Review).
172. Compare 16 U.S.C. § 1277(a) (1982) with Press Release, supra note 171.
173. Press Release, supra note 169, § 313.
174. Id. § 401.
175. Id.
176. Id. § 305.
177. See supra notes 10-1 3; infra notes 219-33 and accompanying text.
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is clear that the private groups define their positions vis-a-vis levels of
government expediently, exploiting the confusion by seeking allies, quite
appropriately, where they can find them. It is also true that significant
cooperation between the major antagonists led to passage of amendments
to the state Act which met mutual goals. The relationships between and
among interest group advocates and their allies in government shifted
constantly as federal and state administrations changed and the interests
were altered and adapted to the priorities of the new incumbents.
Thus far, the only constant in the controversy is the litigation which is
examined in the next part. In going to court, the interest groups were
forced to stake out positions which were, in the context of shifting federal
and state programs, artificially rigid. This, in itself, suggests important
limitations on the court's ability to arbitrate federal-state disputes. More-
over, although most of the litigants have held fast thus far, there is ample
evidence to demonstrate that none of the parties considered their alliances
stable from the outset. Indeed, there are growing indications that some of
the federal defendants may have worked quietly to undermine their own
case.
V. THE NORTH COAST RIVER DESIGNATIONS IN THE
COURTS
Action in the courts began in October 1980, about a month after the
Secretary of the Interior formally accepted California's application to in-
clude the North Coast rivers and after the draft environmental impact
statement was released. Varying combinations of resource development
interests filed at least four different lawsuits in both state and federal
courts against state and federal defendants.
The first case, County of Del Norte v. Brown, 178 was filed in state court
in October, 1980. Four North Coast counties challenged Governor
Brown's authority under the California Act to propose rivers to the Secre-
tary of the Interior when no state management plans had been approved
by the legislature. Simultaneously, the same counties and several timber
companies filed a second suit in federal district court in San Francisco-
this time against Secretary of the Interior Andrus.179 This suit claimed
that the Secretary had prepared an inadequate environmental impact state-
ment on the designations and had violated the timing requirements of
NEPA. It also alleged that the Secretary had violated the requirement
under section 2(a)(ii) of the federal Act that he accept only rivers "that
178. County of Del Norte v. Brown, No. 292,019 (Cal. Super. Ct.. memorandum decision. Dec.
5. 1980).
179. County of Del Norte v. Andrus, No. C-80-3964-WAI (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 16, 1981).
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are to be permanently administered as wild, scenic, or recreational ... by
an agency or political subdivision of the State.' 1 80 In April 1981, the
water developers filed a third suit on essentially the same grounds. 181 A
week later, to add to the confusion, several southern Oregon counties,
timber companies, and lobbyists sued Secretary Andrus in federal district
court in Oregon to protect their interests in the Six Rivers National For-
est. 182 All the federal suits were eventually dismissed on ripeness
grounds. 183 Two of the cases were refiled after Secretary Andrus made his
final decision and left office. 184 The decision in the state suit left the sub-
stantive questions to the federal courts. 185
A. The Parties
1. The Plaintiffs
The timber industry led the opposition to wild and scenic rivers desig-
nation. Its activities were already restricted by the state management of
state-designated lands. 186 But it feared that state administration would be
extended by the proposal to include the management of federal land along
the North Coast rivers, especially the timber-rich land adjacent to the
Smith River. 187 Reasons for the industry's concerns were amply docu-
mented in the record. The state in its Smith River Draft Waterway Man-
agement Plan, prepared in accordance with the state WSRA, was highly
critical of federal agencies' administration of the land. 188 The plan
180. 16 U.S.C. § 1273(a)(ii).
181. Association of Cal. Water Agencies v. United States, No. C-81-1457-WAI (N.D. Cal. filed
April 8, 1981).
182. County ofJosephinev. Andrus, No. C-81-34 (D. Or. filed Jan. 15, 1981).
183. The 9th Circuit dissolved the preliminary injunctions of the two district courts, holding that
the suits could not be brought until there was final agency action. County of Josephine v. Andrus,
No. 81-3036, (9th Cir. Jan. 19, 1981) (consolidated with County ofDel Norte v. Andrus).
184. County of Del Norte v. United States, No. C-81-0567-WAI (N.D. Cal. decided Feb. I1,
1983). Soon thereafter, two of the counties withdrew from the case. Siskiyou County dropped out
and took a neutral position on the designations, while Trinity County withdrew because it decided to
support the designations. Del Norte County, the first named plaintiff in at least half the cases, contin-
ued to lead the effort to minimize timber harvest reductions along the Smith River. Any subsequent
change in the designations or some other political or economic event could easily have juggled the
plaintiffs further. For example, a decision to drop the Eel or lower American Rivers from the national
system might have caused the water interests to drop their case, leaving Del Norte County to fight for
the Smith on its own.
185. See County of Del Norte v. Brown, No. 292,019 (Cal. Super. Ct. April 7, 1981) (memo-
randum decision); County of Josephine v. Watt, 539 F.Supp. 696 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
186. Cal. WSRA, ch. 1259, § 1, 1972 Cal. Stat. 2510 (repealed by ch. 1451, § 14, 1982 Cal.
Stat. 275).
187. Written statement of Robert B. Hoover, President, Cal. Forest Protective Ass'n, reprinted
in 2 FINAL EIS, supra note 104, at VI-247.
188. According to the plan, Forest Service management of federal lands has favored timber har-
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delineated broad zones of the Smith River's watershed which should not
be logged at all, or in which logging should be carefully controlled to
minimize erosion and water quality effects. 189 The state recommended
that the United States Forest Service conform substantially with national
forest regulations and the California WSRA. 190 It also endorsed state su-
pervision of national forest management activities including review of
USFS timber sales within the Smith River drainage or viewshed. The
state also recommended that disapproval or modification recommenda-
tions should be made whenever the California WSRA requirements are
not met. 191
The timber industry concerns, while substantial, have a price, expen-
sive lobbying and litigation costs. The price of fighting the North Coast
designations appears particularly high in light of Secretary Andrus' desig-
nation decision and its evolving significance. Relatively little timberland
is actually affected by Secretary Andrus' final designation. 192 Most of the
timber-rich Smith River is exempt. 193 Of those parts that are included,
many are classified as recreational and not wild or scenic, thus keeping
open the possibility of future loss in the area. Second, the amendments to
the California Act narrow the management corridors for state administra-
tion. 194 Third, the federal management and eligibility guidelines did not
turn out to be nearly as stringent as the timber industry had feared. 195
Finally, the timber industry has been hard hit by the economic decline.
Many companies are actively trying to cancel or extend existing contracts
to harvest forests; 196 few if any are in a position to buy more federal tim-
ber. Indeed, an industry attorney in a closed hearing before the federal
vesting at the expense of recreation and the environment. The Forest Service allowed clear-cutting
and road construction that threatened the Smith River and its tributaries with erosion, stream channel
aggradation, landsliding, loss of vegetation, and a possible decline in fish counts. S1lrrH RIVER
DRAFT PLAN. supra note 123, at 104-06.
189. Id. at 256-59. It found that '[e]xtreme or high erosion hazards exist for over 70 percent of
the Smith's forested drainage. In addition, 15 of the 19 timber sales proposed in the Smith river
drainage are rated as high or extreme erosion hazard potential over most (80%-100%) of the sale
area ..... "Id. at 27 1.
190. Id. at 14.
191. Id. at 295.
192. According to the Secretarial Issue Document, the timber industry's potential loss totaled 8.5
MMBF annually, as compared to 27.5 MMBF per year under Governor Brown's original proposal.
SECRETARIAL ISSUE DOCU.IENT. supra note 135, at 10-11.
193. The total number of river miles protected by designation was 1246, as compared to 4006
under Governor Brown's proposal. Id.
194. CAL Pun RES CODE § 5093.52(c) (West Supp. 1984).
195. See supra notes 165-70 and accompanying text.
196. See. e.g., H.R. 4932, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (Renewable Resources Emergency Act
of 1981) (proposed permiting the termination or extension of timber sales contracts between timber
companies and the Forest Service); H.R. 5012, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (Emergency Timber
Sale Act of 198 1) (same).
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district judge presiding over Del Norte v. United States, the northern Cal-
ifornia case, stated that the designations would not harm the timber indus-
try in the foreseeable future. 197
If the timber industry's stake seems marginal, the water users' could be
viewed as even more so. Dating back to 1960, the water developers have
contracts with the state that they claim include water from the North
Coast rivers, particularly the Eel River. 198 The state will not deliver that
water to the south in the near future, but the contracts run for at least fifty
more years. Although the California WSRA already provides state safe-
guards against water developments for the rivers that are similar to federal
WSRA protections, the water agencies feared that the federal designation
would be an additional barrier to future development. 199
While these fears are not wholly groundless, neither are they an obvi-
ous justification for the political and economic costs incurred in fighting
the designations. With or without Governor Brown's proposal, as modi-
fied by subsequent activities, the rivers are already included in the state
system. Hence, water development by state agencies is precluded. If Cal-
ifornia amended its Act to permit water development by the state, federal
designation would forestall that development. But such an amendment is
unlikely. Historically, California has regulated water and its use at least
as stringently as the federal government. It is true that federal designation
prevents federal water development, but federal water development loses
its charm as both Congress and the Executive push to reduce the subsidies
which water users have long enjoyed. 200 It is difficult to identify a con-
vincing threat which water users could guard against by opposing the de-
signations.
It may be that both the water and timber interests oppose the designa-
tions on procedural grounds: they were cut out of the first stages of the
proposal by apparent government side-stepping. The fact that subsequent
events-Secretary Andrus' decision to exclude the Smith River, plus
197. Telephone interview with Patricia Wells, supra note 100.
198. Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings at 45-62 (June 16, 1981). County of Del Norte v.
United States, No. C-81-567WAI, (N.D. Cal.).
199. Further protection from state action was part of the water policy package agreed to in Apr.
1980, and was slated for inclusion in the state constitution. These amendments were defeated, along
with the Peripheral Canal proposition, in a June 1981 referendum. See supra notes 4, 112-14 and
accompanying text.
200. See Andrews & Fairfax, supra note 29, at nn. 611-19 & 671 and accompanying text; see
also J. McCarthy, The Reclamation Reform Act of 1982: An Investigation of Section 203(b), nn.
17-30 and accompanying text (Sept. 1983) (unpublished manuscript) (copy on file with the Washing-
ton Law Review); A. Paulden, Legal Authority for Recommendations on Rules for Implementation of
Section 203(b) of the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982 (as supplemented July 17, 1983) (Mr. Paul-
den is General Counsel, Arvin-Edison Water Storage District, and Special Counsel, San Luis Water
District) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review).
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changes in federal and state programs, the designation process, and in
management criteria-altered the stakes in the particular instance of the
North Coast case may not wholly allay water and timber interests' con-
cerns about the future.
The most obvious concern on the plaintiffs' side was expressed by the
North Coast counties. If federal designation would forestall timber de-
velopment along the Smith River, as the timber industry claimed, then the
economies of these counties could be harmed. Existing jobs and federal
revenues depend on timber harvesting. As one local council noted:
Sixty-five percent of all employment in Humboldt County and eighty-five
percent in Del Norte County is directly tied to the forest industry .... Tim-
ber production on the Six Rivers National Forest [through which the Smith
River runs] is the single most important factor affecting the ... strength of
the general economy in the North Coast area. 20 1
However, the persistent recession in the timber economy has affected
each county differently. Whereas Del Norte County continues to defend
the suit it initiated in cooperation with Humboldt, Siskiyou, and Trinity
Counties, the other three localities have withdrawn. 20 2 The presently
strapped timber industry may appear less attractive than the fishing and
recreation industries as a county economic base. Finally, some northern
county supervisors' support for the litigation 20 3 may have been cooled by
the fact that they found themselves allied in the dispute with their tradi-
tional rivals, the water importers.
The plaintiffs are a shaky team in terms of the relationship between
their unique and changing interests and alliances. It is easy to see why
each started the case, but the basis for their continuing involvement is
increasingly difficult to discern.
Although their concerns may justify their initial joint reaction, the tim-
ber and water plaintiffs might part company. Changing economic condi-
tions are unlikely to sway the water developers because their interests
arise from contracts that extend fifty years into the future. The water dev-
elopers, as they have done in the past, may continue to try to protect those
contracts against any eventuality, even one that seemingly is remote. The
timber industry, on the other hand, has been hard hit by the economy.
Moreover, the shifts in federal and state law and in decisionmakers have
201. Six Rivers Resource Council, FACTS To help you Understand the Six Rivers National
Forest Problem I (Mar. 6. 1981). But see SECRETARIAL ISSUE DoCUMENT. supra note 135, at II
(estimates loss of 62 timber industry jobs and $1.075 million in county revenues).
202. County of Del Norte v. United States, No. C-81-0567-WAI (N.D. Cal. decided Feb. II.
1983).
203. Remarks made at speech by Professor Sally Fairfax, Forestry Forum. University of Califor-
nia, Berkeley (May 2. 1983) (notes on file with the Washington Law Review).
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reduced the harm that federal river designation could cause the timber
industry in the foreseeable future. If economic conditions in the timber
business do not recover more rapidly than the rest of the economy, the
timber interests may find that the high costs of the litigation outweigh the
speculative and distant threats that designation poses.
More significant for federalism theory is the alignment of government
parties. A disintegrating coalition of counties is defending the full letter
of a state statute. The coalition is opposed in that effort by the state itself,
plus the federal and state governments working together in a similarly
unstable union. The conflicting sovereign model falls far from reality in
the present instance.
2. The Defendants
The state and federal governments were at least temporarily comrades
in court. This was initially because the federal law gave the state's system
a role which both levels of government were trying to effectuate. Indeed,
under section 2(a)(ii) of WSRA, both levels were necessary to implement
the authority at issue.204 When the Reagan Administration took office, the
nature of the federal-state bond changed; the federal government had to
defend the EIS in spite of minute defects. 205
Despite the compatability of the federal and state interests regarding
the Secretary's decision, it was clear from the outset that subsequent ad-
ministrations at either level could oppose it or undermine efforts to defend
it in the courts. The North Coast rivers became controversial precisely
because the Department of the Interior officials rushed the process so that
the Carter Administration could make the decision. When Secretary An-
drus left office, with the legality of the action unsettled, the Reagan Ad-
ministration had to determine its own policy regarding the case. President
Reagan's appointee, James Watt, was widely expected to oppose the de-
signations or to urge the Justice Department to concede the federal de-
fense.
204. This situation was unlike the statutory concession to state law under the 1902 Reclamation
Act, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (1902) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 43 U.S.C.), which
had spurred United States v. California, 438 U.S. 645 (1978). Section 8 of the 1902 Act, which
required the Secretary of the Interior to "proceed in conformity with" state law in carrying out the
federal reclamation program, 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1976), could be invoked by the unilateral action of
either level of government. The United States v. California case arose when California tried to regu-
late several units of the federal Central Valley Project through its water rights process for environ-
mental protection purposes. Just as in WSRA case, the state used an explicit congressional provision
to assert its authority to protect rivers from federal activity. Unlike in the WSRA case, however, the
state exercised its authority unilaterally, met with federal resistance, and found itself opposed by the
federal government in court. See generally B. ANDREWS & M. SANSOME, supra note 92.
205. See infra note 241 and accompanying text.
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While the new administration assessed its position, the California At-
torney General filed a motion to intervene in the case. The court granted
the motion and thus ensured that there would be a defendant in the case
should the Reagan Administration decide to withdraw. 206
Although the state took an early aggressive position in court, there was
by no means unanimity within the state on the issue. Bills were intro-
duced in the legislature to rein in the Resources Agency by cutting its
wild and scenic rivers budget, curtailing its management authority, and
other means. 207 These efforts evince considerable opposition within the
state and the legislature to the substance and procedure of Governor
Brown's proposed inclusions. 20 8 The proposals did not pass for two
years, but even at the outset of the dispute, the state was not speaking
with one voice on the issue. 209
The environmental groups were understandably concerned lest their
own interests be submerged in this pastiche of conflicting litigation goals.
The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), therefore, joined the federal
and state defendants to assure that there would be at least one defendant if
the federal and/or state governments dropped out. 210
The goals of the environmentalists in the suit seem fairly standard. The
beauty and natural features of the North Coast have attracted nationwide
attention. A Forest Service wilderness study was a major issue on the
North Coast and, in many instances, geographically overlapped with wild
and scenic river corridors. The United States Bureau of Land Manage-
ment was also in the process of studying a 17,187-acre wilderness area
through which the middle fork of the Eel River flowed.2t '
But the environmentalists' enthusiasm for the river designation was al-
tered by the narrow scope of the designation. Secretary Andrus included
less than one-fourth of the initially proposed land and river areas, and
most of the designated areas received recreational status, the least protec-
tive. While environmentalists have won something by designation, they
have gained much less than they hoped. Moreover, in pursuing the desig-
nation via lawsuit, they have explicitly attacked Forest Service programs
and authorities. With or without designation, the Forest Service manages
206. State of California's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Inter-
vene, at 5-6 (Feb. 6, 1981), Del Norte v. United States, No. C-81-0567-WAI (N.D. Cal. 1981).
207. See. e.g., Cal. A.B. 1349, 1981-82 Reg. Sess. (1981), discussed in supra notes 153-64
and accompanying text.
208. See Letter from Cal. Assemblyman Douglas H. Bosco and 85 California assemblymen to
Cecil Andrus, Secretary, U.S. Dep't of the Interior (Aug. 18, 1980) (copy on tile with the Washing-
ton Law Review).
209. San Francisco Chron., June 3, 1981, at 3, col. 3.
210. The EDF intervened under FED R. CIv. P. 24(a). See Environmental Defense Fund's Mo-
tion to Intervene at 4, County of Del Norte v. United States, No. C-81-0567-WAI (N.D. Cal. 1981).
211. 1 FINAL EIS, supra note 104, at I-5.
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the national forest lands around the Smith River. What environmentalists
gain by assuring strong state voice in national forest management could
be lost in Forest Service hostility to the process and its advocates. Finally,
the environmentalists' expectations regarding the results of state partici-
pation were altered by the change in the political leadership of California.
The most reasonable argument favoring continued environmentalist de-
fense of federal designation is the fear that a state designation alone
would be found by some future court to be inadequate to prevent the
FERC from licensing a power development. FERC believes its authority
to license large and small hydropower developments is not compromised
by state wild and scenic rivers designations. 212 The Supreme Court has
supported FERC's interpretation of its authority as against the require-
ments of state law. 213 Moreover, recent Vermont litigation suggests that
this interpretation continues to be applicable, at least insofar as FERC's
212. See letter from FERC Chairman C.M. Butler III to Joseph E. Brennan, Governor, State of
Maine (Aug. 3, 1982) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review), stating that "[i]n light of our
responsibilities under the Federal Power Act, I cannot assure you that the Commission will not autho-
rize hydropower development on one or more of the sixteen rivers designated in Executive Order IFY
82133." Id. at 2; see also supra note 64 (discussion of the New River, North Carolina litigation and
legislation). FERC licensed a dam on the New River while the Secretary of the Interior weighed a
North Carolina § 2(a)(ii) application. See Memorandum in Opposition to Motion of United States to
Dismiss Appeal of Environmental Defense Fund, County of Del Norte v. United States, No. 83-1761
(9th Cir. July 1, 1983); Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration and Application for
Stay Pending Appeal, County of Del Norte v. United States, No. C-81-0567-WAI (N.D. Cal. March
9, 1983) at 13 n.5 and accompanying text.
213. First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152 (1946), held that
procedural compliance rather than state approval meets the requirements of §§ 9 and 27 of the Federal
Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 802, 821 (1982). Section 9 requires that:
Each applicant for a license under this [Act] shall submit to the commission-
(b) Satisfactory evidence that the applicant has complied with the requirements of the laws of
the State or States within which the proposed project is to be located with respect to bed and
banks and to the appropriation, diversion, and use of water... and in any other business neces-
sary to effect the purposes of a license under this [Act].
Id. § 802. Section 27 states that:
Nothing contained in this [Act] shall be construed as affecting or intending to affect or in any
way to interfere with the laws of the respective States relating to the control, appropriation, use,
or distribution of water used in irrigation or for municipal or other uses, or any vested right
acquired therein.
Id. § 821. Nevertheless, the First Iowa Court held that federal authority over the licensing of
hydroelectric projects preempts state law. The Court found that § 9 did not "require compliance with
any state laws." Firstlowa, 328 U.S. at 177 (emphasis added). Thus, § 9 will be satisfied when state
procedural requirements are met, even if a state turns down an application under state law, that was
sufficient information to present the Commission of a "national policy for water power develop-
ment." Id. at 183 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also id. at 180 n. 23 (relying on testimony depict-
ing the conservation movement sired by Gifford Pinchot and Theodore Roosevelt as unflinchingly
national and comprehensive in focus). For a contrary, and generally more respected discussion, see
S. HAYS, CONSERVATrON AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFIcIENcY, passim (1959).
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authority to license facilities not in conformity with local land use
plans. 214
Recent litigation combined with the special historical circumstances of
federal deference to state water law and the fact that WSRA specifically
modifies the Federal Power Act, could support an argument that FERC's
general policy statements are insufficient to displace specific state and
federal preservation projects. 215 Nevertheless, EDF may have concluded
214. Town of Springfield v. McCarren, 549 F. Supp 1134, 1154 (D. Vt. 1982). Springfield
suggests that one important key to the relationship between FERC and WSRA is the relationship
between First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152 (1946). and
California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978); 549 F. Supp. at 1154-57. California v. United
States interpreted § 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902, which provides that:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting or intended to affect or to in any way
interfere with the laws of any State or Territory relating to the control, appropriation, use, or
distribution of water used in irrigation, or any vested right acquired thereunder, and the Secre-
tary of the Interior, in carrying out the provisions of this Act, shall proceed in conformity with
such laws ....
43 U.S.C. § 383 (1976). In California v. United States, the Supreme Court arguably came to a
conclusion signficiantly different from that in First Iowa, breaking a long chain of § 8 cases by
holding that state law was operative and bound the Bureau of Reclamation unless it directly contra-
vened congressional intent as expressed in the 1902 Reclamation Act or in subsequent legislation.
The Springfield court inquired whether California v. United States implicitly overturned First Iowa
and concluded "that it has not.... Notwithstanding some similarity in the wording of the statutes,
they serve different objectives, and relate to federal actions fundamentally dissimilar in nature."
Springfield, 549 F. Supp. at 1154. The unifying theme in both decisions, reasoned the court in
Springfield, is that duplicate regulations are avoided. Id. at 1156. States have primary jurisdiction
over western water rights under California v. United States, whereas the federal government has
exclusive jurisdiction over licensing of hydropower projects under First Iowa. See id. at 1156. This
view appears to depend on an excessively narrow view of water resources and water management
policies and the stylized notions of federal-state conflict which are the focus of this article's attention.
215. Recent litigation suggests an alternative to the Springfield court's juxtaposition of First
Iowa and California v. United States. In Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conser-
vation & Dev. Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 1713 (1983), the Supreme Court upheld California's carefully
tailored state program regulating nuclear power plants, rejecting PG&E's assertions that it was
preempted by federal law. The Court noted with approval its holding in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (one year after First Iowa), that because Congress had legislated in
an area traditionally occupied by the states, the Court would " 'start with the assumption that the
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress.' " Pacific Gas, 103 S. Ct. at 1723 (quoting Rice, 331 U.S.
at 230). The Court noted that although a state law is necessarily preempted if it is an obstacle to the
accomplishment of the " 'full purposes and objectives of Congress,' " Pacific Gas, 103 S. Ct. at
1722 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)), the congressional goal is not to be
accomplished at any costs. Pacific Gas, 103 S. Ct. at 1731. The holding in California v. United
States states that only "specific congressional directives which were contrary to state law ... would
override that law." California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 672 n.25 (1978) (emphasis added).
That discussion, plus the holding in the Pacific Gas case encouraged state advocates to think that
FERC might be containable. Some of the basis for that position may have been lost when the New
Melones case, California v. United States, 694 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1982), was reargued on remand.
The State of California argued "that only explicit federal statutory policies . . . are sufficient to
preempt the operation of inconsistent state law." Id. at 1176. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that California's "broad contentions must be rejected," and concluded that "a state limitation or
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that it is better to defend the designations now than to risk losing in a
subsequent confrontation with FERC. Finally, leadership in this matter
may be seen as serving important public relations goals for EDF. Increas-
ingly involved in rather esoteric economic discussions of environmental
issues, EDF's prominent role in the more traditional forms of advocacy
keeps it in touch with important support groups. 216
B. The Litigation
Litigation began in the North Coast controversy well before Secretary
Andrus' decision initially altered the effected interest groups' calculation
of costs and benefits. The plaintiffs' arguments alleged that Governor
Brown and Secretary Andrus had acted prematurely in two respects: (1)
before the California legislature had approved management plans for the
North Coast additions to the state wild and scenic rivers; and (2) before an
adequate EIS had been prepared and circulated under NEPA.
The case in state court, County of Del Norte v. Brown,2 17 focused pri-
marily on the first issue. The court held that, in the absence of legisla-
tively approved river management plans required by the state act, the
governor did not have the authority to commit the state to permanently
administer the rivers. 218 However, the state court deferred to the federal
court to interpret the significance of that holding in light of the federal
requirement for that commitment. 219 Because the Supreme Court decision
did not appear to resolve the North Coast controversy, it was bypassed in
the suspenseful drama created by the trio of federal cases.
condition on the federal management or control of a federally financed water project is valid unless it
clashes with express or clearly implied congressional intent or works at cross-purposes with an im-
portant federal interest served by the congressional scheme." Id. at 1177 (emphasis added). How-
ever, the state's argument is strengthened in the WSRA context, and distinguished from Springfield
in which FERC's licensing powers rose above local zoning requirements, by three factors: first, the
federal government has a long history of arguable deference to state water law, as noted in Spring-
field; see supra note 214; second, the state river preservation program is clearly a part of implement-
ing the federal statute; finally, the federal WSRA was specifically intended to modify and balance
FERC's missions and authorities. This paper enters the fracas obliquely, arguing that there is no
single federal interest and that in a crowded policy arena it is difficult to identify "the" pertinent
congressional scheme. This would seem to provide aid and comfort to advocates of specific preemp-
tion criteria. For a long list of articles discussing preemption, see Fairfax, supra note 14, at 950 n. 18.
For a related discussion, see J. MASHAW, BuREAucRATc JUSTICE 52-64 (1983) (administration of
social security disability claims).
216. See Emshwiller, Environmental Group, In Change of Strategy, Is Stressing Economics,
Wall St. J., Sept. 28, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
217. County of Del Norte v. Brown, No. 292,019 (Cal. Super. Ct. April 7, 1981) (memorandum
decision).
218. Id. at 5.
219. Id. at 7.
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The NEPA arguments were given closer attention by the federal courts
at the early stages of the litigation. In January 1981, before the close of
the Carter Administration, federal district courts both in San Francisco
and Portland issued injunctions and temporary restraining orders against
Secretary Andrus on NEPA grounds. The Oregon district court ruled that
the multivolume environmental impact statement, prepared by the HCRS
and the Resources Agency, was inadequate because it failed to consider
timber impacts in the southern part of the state. 220 Therefore, Secretary
Andrus could not act on Governor Brown's proposal.
Similarly, the northern California district court held that a decision by
Secretary Andrus would interfere with the mandatory waiting period be-
tween the filing of a final environmental impact statement and when a
decision is made.22 ' The regulations require a thirty-day period after the
government publishes notice of the environmental impact statement in the
Federal Register 222 before an agency can render a decision. The court
found that the thirty-day period could not have begun before December
22, 1980, and therefore would not end until two days after President Re-
gean was inaugurated. 223 Secretary Andrus, therefore, was barred under
NEPA from making the designation decision before leaving office. The
decision would have to be made by Secretary Watt. That appeared to end
the matter.
Four days later, one day before the Carter Administration left office,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed summarily, ruling that Secre-
tary Andrus could indeed act. 224 The court did not reach the merits of the
NEPA claim; it only held that the issue was not ripe for judicial review. 225
The designations could be challenged on exactly the same legal grounds,
but only after the Interior Secretary made the designations and "final
agency action" occurred. The court dismissed the actions, giving the
plaintiffs the right to refile the suits once the decision was made. 226 Secre-
220. County of Josephine v. Andrus, No. C-81-34 (D. Or. filed Jan. 15, 1981).
221. County of Del Norte v. Andrus, No. C-80-3964-WAI (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 16, 1981). The
merits of this issue revolved around the minute details of when the environmental impact statement
was delivered to the Environmental Protection Agency and when the earliest Federal Register notice
possible under NEPA regulations could have occurred. Federal Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiff's
Motions for Summary Judgment at 41 (June 1, 1981), County of Del Norte v. United States, No. C-
81-0567-WAI (N.D. Cal.).
222. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.10 (1983).
223. Del Norte v. Andrus, No. C-80-3964-WAI (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 16, 1981), at 7-8. For a
full discussion of the regulations and the court's reasoning, see infra note 269 and accompanying
text.
224. County of Del Norte v. United States, No. 83-1761 (9th Cir. Dec. 26, 1980).
225. Id.
226. County of Josephine v. Andrus, No. C-81-34 (D.Or. filed Jan. 15, 1981); County of Del
Norte v. Andrus, No. C-80-3964-WAI (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 16, 1981).
462
Vol. 59:417, 1984
Federalism and the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act
tary Andrus designated the rivers the following morning, during his final
hours in office.
After Secretary Andrus designated the rivers, two of the four cases
were refiled. The Oregon action, County of Josephine v. Watt,227 was the
first case decided. Plaintiffs alleged that the Department of the Interior
failed to allow sufficient participation of Oregon interests in the prepara-
tion of the EIS.228 They also claimed that the EIS failed to analyze suffi-
ciently how the river designations would impact Oregon interests. 229 Fi-
nally, the plaintiffs asserted that the entire process was not conducted in
good faith and that the Department of the Interior sped through NEPA
procedures to allow Secretary Andrus to make the decision before the
new President could be inaugurated. 230
The district court granted the defendants summary judgment on all
causes of action except that the issue concerning the adequacy of the EIS
was reserved for trial. 231 Of the alleged procedural violations the court
found that, although several had occurred, none prejudiced the interest of
the plaintiffs or invalidated the EIS. Oregon residents did receive actual
notice of, and had input into, the EIS production. 232 The court found that
the Department of the Interior made significant efforts to obtain com-
ments from Oregon and northern California residents, and had carefully
considered what the "secondary" impact designation would have on tim-
ber interests in southern Oregon. 233 The court also found that the Depart-
ment's desire to speed through the process did not injure plaintiffs or evi-
dence bad faith on the part of the government. 234 Therefore, the court
declared that the Interior Department did conduct NEPA process in good
faith.235
The second case, brought by North Coast local governments, endures
as the major focus of contention. It considers substantially the same is-
sues as County of Josephine v. Watt and, on similar facts, may ultimately
reach an opposite conclusion. In County of Del Norte v. United States,
the plaintiffs also alleged substantive deficiencies in the EIS and proce-
227. 539 F. Supp. 696 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
228. Id. at 698-99. The specific allegations were that the Department failed to invite organiza-
tions to the "scoping" process (a process to set forth the issues the EIS will address) and that the
agency failed to send copies of the draft EIS to the Oregon parties.
229. Id. at 699.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 704-06.
233. The court found that while the designation might affect the local economies in southern
Oregon, the primary impact would be on the areas in northern California. Id. at 705. This is the
subject of the County of Del Norte v. United States litigation. See infra note 236.
234. See supra notes 224-231.
235. City of Josephine v. Watt, 539 F. Supp. at 706.
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dural irregularities under NEPA in the preparation of the document. 236
The plaintiffs also reasserted that the designation violated the federal
WSRA because in the absence of state legislative approved management
plans, the governor could not guarantee permanent administration of the
designated rivers as required by the federal Act. 237
The district court opinion in the Del Norte case came in two stages. In
October 1982, the judge circulated for comment a proposed decision. 238
The Memorandum of Intended Decision focused on the alleged problems
in the EIS; the court ignored the issue of whether the governor could com-
mit the state to permanent administration of the river in the absence of a
legislatively approved management plan. 239 The final decision reconsid-
ered many of the previously discussed NEPA issues and, at last, indi-
rectly addressed the ambiguities around the permanent administration is-
sue which arise from differences between the federal and state laws.
The NEPA component of the decision is unusual. The court concluded
that several of the alleged inadequacies in the EIS were too complex to be
resolved on summary judgment and that several might be worth evalua-
tion at a trial.2 40 The key issue discussed-whether the government had
harmed the plaintiffs by illegally shortening the comment period by two
days-is also unusual. A fairly straightforward problem of counting days
elapsed since EIS filing was complicated by the fact that the government
official signed a standard form which inaccurately stated that "complete
distribution to all agencies and parties" was made at the time the impact
statement was filed with the EPA. In fact, although the plaintiffs had the
statement for more than thirty days prior to the Secretary's decision, they
did not have it for the mandatory thirty days after "proper" notice.241
236. Memorandum of Decision at 4, 9, County of Del Norte v. United States, No. C-81-0567-
WAI (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 11, 1983).
237. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judg-
ment, at 46-60, County of Del Norte v. United States, No. C-81-0567-WAI (N.D. Cal. filed Mar.
24. 1981).
238. Memorandum of Decision, County of Del Norte v. United States, No. C-81-0567-WAI
(N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 1I, 1983).
239. Id. at 14-17.
240. Id. at 10.
241. Id. at 5-9. The factual situation central to the dispute was exceedingly complex. The De-
partment of the Interior submitted the Final EIS to the EPA, as required by NEPA regulations, on
Friday, December 12, 1980. The following week the Department distributed copies to all interested
parties, including plaintiffs. The following Wednesday, December 17, 1980, the same day the plain-
tiffs received their copies, the Department published notice of the EIS completion in the Federal
Register, again pursuant to regulations requiring publication the week after filing. This publication
should have allowed Secretary Andrus to make a decision after 30 days, or on January 16, five days
before he left office.
A problem arose, however, with the document signed by an employee of the Interior Department
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One interpretation of the Del Norte decision is that the court concluded
that false verification was the crucial factor because the Department of the
Interior had not acted in good faith in its conduct of the NEPA process.
The court testily noted that "[i]t ill-becomes the federal defendants ... to
characterize as trivial that which admittedly arises from the false verifica-
tion of an employee of the defendents. "242
The other legal question in the designation controversy is the perma-
nent administration issue. As noted above, under the federal Act state
rivers cannot be federally included unless the state is committed to perma-
nently administer them. The state Act required the administering agency,
the Resources Agency, to submit management plans to the legislature for
approval. 243 The California Assembly, however, refused to give that ap-
proval. The Resources Agency, through its departments, continued to
manage the rivers as set out in the California Act and in other California
statutes. The designation advocates argued that this management author-
ity satisfies the permanent administration requirement in the federal
Act. 244 The plaintiffs insisted that, absent a legislatively approved state
plan, the federal provision is not met. 245
These cases present an instance of federal-state cooperation and con-
flict which results in the classic issue of which law-federal or state-is
controlling. The fact that a county was defending the minutiae of the state
Act against the combined arguments of the federal and state governments
confounds the model somewhat, but the conflict of laws question was,
nonetheless, before the court. The Del Norte court conceded that the Re-
source Agency plans submitted to the Secretary were indeed "more de-
tailed and comprehensive than plans submitted and approved with respect
on Decmber 12, 1980. The document incorrectly verified that the employee had mailed copies of the
EIS to interested parties. In fact, the employee did not do so until three days later, on Monday,
December 15, 1980.
The issue was whether the false verification damaged the plaintiffs. Officials from the EPA submit-
ted affidavits stating that the employee signed the wrong form and that the agency does not normally
and need not verify that copies have been provided before the publication in the Federal Register.
Thus the false verification was irrelevant, since no verification was necessary. The court held other-
wise. In its Memorandum of Decision, it found that true verification could not have been made before
Monday, December 15, and therefore, publication in the Federal Register could not occur before the
following week, the week of Dec. 22. Memorandum of Decision, supra note 236, at 7, County of
Del Norte v. United States, No. C-81-0567-WAI (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 11, 1983). Thus, Secretary
Andrus could not have made the decision before January 21, which was after his term ended.
242. Id. at 10.
243. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 5093.58 (repealed by ch. 1481, § 10, 1982 Cal. Stat. 275).
244. California Resources Agency, California Administration of Those Rivers Included in the
State's Request for National Wild and Scenic Rivers Designation (1980), reprinted in FINAL EIS,
supra note 102, app. E.
245. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judg-
ment, supra note 237, at 46-60.
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to the application for designation of" previous governor-nominated riv-
ers. 246 The court stated that, "[i]n those cases, however, there was no
question of the [governor's] legal right to make the representation of the
ability and willingness [of the state] to permanently administer the riv-
ers." 247 Then to resolve the issue, the court chose to ignore the interven-
ing amendments to the state act. 248 Instead, it pointed to the conclusion of
the state court regarding the same question. Invoking the holding in
County of Del Norte v. Brown, which had previously seemed to be incon-
sequential, the court concluded: "[w]hen a state court has determined that
the state has no legal right to make a representation because of non-
compliance with state law, I think that the Secretary of the Interior needs
to consider whether a necessary and relevant precedent to his exercise of
discretion has been lawfully fulfilled.' '249
The state court's decision was not, according to the court, adequately
presented to the Secretary. 250 The designation decision was, therefore,
remanded to the Secretary for consideration of "all relevant factors.', 25'
The impact of the long awaited Del Norte decision is both unclear and
presently in limbo. If it stands, it invalidates former Secretary Andrus'
North Coast rivers designation. It is not clear, however, what its effect
will be. Specifically, it is difficult to identify the status quo ante to which
the district court opinion would return the process. The Secretary of the
Interior would have several options. The Secretary could simply order an
extended comment period and then redecide the issue. This would resolve
the false verification issue and could end the proposal entirely. The Secre-
tary could find the application invalid on the grounds proffered by the
court-the absence of a legislatively approved state management plan.
That holding would be, however, subject to appeal, and another court
might not ignore the new state legislation as did the district court. Alter-
natively, because the court has strongly hinted that the EIS analyses are
inadequate, the Secretary might, before proceeding, decide to order the
preparation of a new EIS on Governor Brown's original application to
designate 4000 miles of the rivers. Although a new EIS could provide
grounds to deny or restrict federal designation, all 4000 miles of the rivers
would be protected while the application was pending. 252
246. Memorandum of Decision, supra note 233, at 12 (emphasis added).
247. Id.
248. Id. at 2.
249. Id. at 13.
250. "'Its full import was not set forth, and secretarial consideration may thereby have been unduly
limited." Id. at 14.
251. Id.
252. Some environmentalists would prefer to see Secretary of the Interior Clark reconsider the
1600 miles designated by Secretary Andrus rather than the state-proposed 4000 miles.
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The Governor's position on a reapplication may have been indicated by
his announcement that the state will no longer defend the designations as
a participant in a Del Norte decision appeal. 253 The federal government
decision on whether to appeal the Del Norte decision was complicated by
the fact that the river designations may be viewed as a minor aspect of the
case. The Del Norte court's interpretation of procedural injury under
NEPA could have serious negative consequences for many future govern-
ment actions. Government agencies regularly violate EIS procedures in
minor ways, inadvertently or not. Relying on Del Norte challengers of
agency programs could overturn decisions on the basis of similar minor
technical violations. This would make all agency actions vulnerable.
Therefore, it may make sense for the federal defendants to vigorously
defend the process, regardless of their opinion on the North Coast desig-
nations.
To allay those concerns with technical violations, but without yielding
on the river designation issue, the plaintiffs indicated, on the basis of the
district court's Memorandum of Intended Opinion, that the decision will
only invalidate agency action where false verification occurs. 254 The dis-
trict court's decision can be read to support that position, but other read-
ings are inevitable as well.
Given the apparent hostility of the state to the designations and the fed-
eral defendants waffling on the false-verification issue, the EDF was anxi-
ous to prevent the district court order from becoming effective. The EDF
feared that the new governor would simply ask that the nominations be
returned for reconsideration, hence ending the matter. 255 Therefore the
EDF applied for and was granted a stay pending appeal. Meanwhile, the
federal position continues to be ambivalent. Apparently unable to resolve
internal disputes on the matter, the Department of Justice first moved to
have the EDF appeal (and its own) dismissed;25 6 when that effort
failed, 257 it joined the appeal. The hearing was set for October 1983, and
the decision of the appeals court will probably not be announced within a
year. Meanwhile, of course, President Reagan's initial appointment as
Secretary of the Interior has departed and a new Secretary with little or no
established record on resource issues has been confirmed. By the time the
253. Sacramento Bee, Apr. 27, 1983, at A-I, A-14, col. 1.
254. Telephone interview with Patricia Wells, supra note 100.
255. Memorandum in Opposition to Motion of the United States to Dismiss Appeal of Environ-
mental Defense Fund, at 14, County of Del None v. United States, No. 83-1761 (9th Cir. 1980).
256. Motion to Dismiss Appeal of Environmental Defense Fund and Concurrently to Dismiss
Appeal of the United States of America, County of Del Norte v. United States, No. 83-1761 (9th Cir.
1981).
257. County of Del Norte v. United States, No. 83-1761 (9th Cir.) (order entered July 11, 1983).
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appeal is decided there will be another presidential election; and who can
say what will take place hurriedly in anticipation of its outcome.
C. The Implications of the Litigation
The North Coast rivers litigation highlights the difficulty the courts
have in resolving federal-state conflicts generally, and over resource man-
agement. Part of this problem is of the courts' choosing. Throughout this
dispute, the federal court embraced the procedural questions raised by
NEPA and ignored, until the very last round in Del Norte, the federal-
state issues posed by WSRA. It is not surprising, therefore, that its dis-
cussions seem stylized, tedious, and trivial. The courts, however, should
not take all the blame. The interests involved are broader and more com-
plex than the traditionally conceived federal-state relationships. In many
ways, the federal and state governments are not even the major stakehold-
ers in the controversy. The private interests-the timber, water, and min-
eral industries; the evironmentalists; and the counties themselves-have
more to gain or lose than either the Department of the Interior or the gov-
ernor. Moreover, federal and state players in this area have been in con-
stant flux. Because WSRA leaves most of the designation decisionmaking
with the governor and cabinet-level secretaries on both the federal and
state levels, their positions on the controversy are likely to be transient.
While the private parties to the conflict are less likely to be tied to elec-
toral change, their goals will vary depending on where they can find allies
for their interests. Certainly, both timber and water groups will feel
threatened by what they view as the government's rushed procedures.
However, between the depressed economy, the California legislature's
management corridor restrictions, and the decision to exclude 2400 miles
of timber land on the Smith River from designation, the timber industry's
economic interest is minimal. The concerns of the water developers, on
the other hand, remain unabated, and they may someday seek water from
the Eel River to meet their goals. The whole question of FERC's future
involvement could be raised if the designations fail, bringing with it fasci-
nating potential for continuing the litigation into the 1990's.
Of all the parties, however, the environmentalists may be the most sta-
ble in the controversy. Their concern, in some ways, may be less intense
than that of the timber and water groups because their livelihoods do not
depend on the outcome; however, their interests are not likely to be rede-
fined by changes in the economy. Of course, their own resources and the
political climate may force them to alter their priorities. But in this case,
the EDF may outlast the state and federal governments as well as the tim-
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ber industry and wind up confronting the still unheard-from hydropower
interests.
The present case suggests that litigation is neither a clear path to resolu-
tion of federal-state conflicts nor an alternative to other approaches.
While a legal dispute winds its tortuous way through months and years of
adjudication, different, more fluid aspects of river management are inch-
ing along in a variety of equally incremental forums.
The federal and state agencies involved in the North Coast rivers litiga-
tion already interact extensively with each other and with private interests
on the basis of cooperative patterns established in other resource areas. In
the specific case of the North Coast rivers where federal lands are in-
volved, Congress has, both in WSRA and in the National Forest Manage-
ment Act, defined an extensive planning process based on a cooperation
and negotiation approach to dispute settlement. The designation issue
may have been one with which the courts could deal, although their rec-
ord to date has been less than inspiring. Long-term balancing of conflict-
ing uses would seem even less amenable to adjudication, especially
where Congress has so emphatically granted management discretion to
the United States Forest Service.
This does not, however, presage federal dominance of the issue. The
future complexion of federal-state relations under WSRA is hard to pred-
ict. The strong position of the states in Western water has etched into
federal policy the general theme that, interstate situations aside, water is
the business of the states. The North Coast experience shows that con-
flicts and solutions are not that simple, particularly when land manage-
ment concerns are approached obliquely through the water statutory
framework. There is no "federal" or "state" position in complex policy
arenas characterized by numerous government entities exercising con-
flicting authorities to achieve diverse, and frequently incompatible public
goals.
Most emphatically, therefore, the North Coast controversy is neither a
federal-state conflict nor a cooperative undertaking. Which levels of gov-
ernment will advocate which causes and to what extent they will clash or
mutually accommodate are important components of the ongoing dispute.
However, central to the inquiry will be the diverse and intense conflict
over resource values of the North Coast: the timber, water, and minerals
industries contending with aesthetic, recreation, and fisheries groups in
varying, unpredictable, and frequently impenetrable degrees of discord
and harmony. They will embrace one level of government in preference
to another on an opportunistic basis, depending on where and when they
can find support for their goals.
Federalism emerges from all this neither as inevitable conflict nor de-
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sirable cooperation; rather, it is a part of the format in which the opposing
forces contend. In our federal system, advocates have diverse options
and, thwarted at one level with one set of rules and administrators, they
will seek a more sympathetic hearing at another. The courts' less flexible
approach may appear as a stabilizing or fundamental factor. In the North
Coast designations controversy, however, it appears tangential to the dis-
pute over land and water management.
Author's Note-As this article was in press, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals handed down a decision in County of Del Norte v. United States,
No. 81-1761 (9th Cir. decided May ], 1984). The Ninth Circuit reversed
the district court's finding that the premature filing notice of the EIS in-
validated the Secretary's river designations. Id. at 2191. The procedural
irregularity was held to be "trivial" by the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 2193.
The court also held that Secretary Andrus had adequately considered
whether California could "permanently administer" the designated riv-
ers as required by WSRA. Id. at 2194. The Del Norte decision leaves
many issues remaining unresolved. See supra page 466. More notably,
the decision represents another chapter in the continuing chaotic and
confusing saga of thisfederalism controversy.
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